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ABSTRACT
North Carolina has a new LLC act. If LLC members assert that the
managers or controlling members have in some manner breached fiduciary
or contractual duties owed to the complaining members or to the LLC, how
will lawyers handle such claims? This Article first considers the
circumstances in which North Carolina LLC managers and members may
owe fiduciary duties to other members. Assuming that there is a duty that
may have been breached, what are the limits on a member bringing a
direct suit either on her own behalf or on behalf of the LLC? Since direct
suits will now be prohibited in many cases, the plaintiff must likely resort to
bringing a derivative claim. The problems with these suits under the new
law are considered in some detail. Lastly, the Article provides drafting
suggestions to protect LLC members, as well as alternative methods to
resolve disputes among LLC members and managers.



INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 227
I.  DO LLC MANAGERS OWE FIDUCIARY DUTIES? ............................ 227
A. Fiduciary Duties Created by Status ........................................ 228
B. Fiduciary Duties Created in “Fact” ....................................... 230
II.  MAY A MEMBER SUE ON BEHALF OF THE LLC FOR AN INJURY
TO THE LLC? .................................................................................. 235
III.  WHAT IF A MANAGER BREACHES A DUTY OWED DIRECTLY TO
A MEMBER? .................................................................................... 238

* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.

225

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

1

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1

226

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:225

A. Barger Rule.............................................................................. 238
B. Second Restriction ................................................................... 240
C. New Law—Same Result?......................................................... 242
IV.   DERIVATIVE SUITS AS THE SOLUTION? .......................................... 243
A. When Is a Derivative Suit Permitted? ..................................... 243
B. Whose Law Controls? ............................................................. 244
C. What Are the New Required Procedures? .............................. 245
D. What Problems Are Created by the Requirement that
Disputes Among LLC Members and Managers Must Be
Resolved Through a Derivative Suit? ..................................... 249
1. The statute is procedurally confusing as to how a
demand is rejected and how a motion to dismiss is to be
filed and evaluated ............................................................ 249
2. Inadvertent failure to carefully follow the rules—
particularly when the plaintiffs assume that they may
proceed directly ................................................................. 252
3. Plaintiff is not a member at the time the action is filed
or the LLC is no longer in existence.................................. 252
4. A plus for the plaintiffs, the new statute may make it
much more difficult for the defendants to have the suit
dismissed ........................................................................... 256
5. The plaintiff may have difficulty pleading
“particularized facts” ....................................................... 261
6. It is likely unclear how a court will determine if a
proper evaluation has been made by those seeking to
dismiss ............................................................................... 262
7. The role of the court in ruling on a defendant’s motion
to dismiss may be confusing .............................................. 263
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION ................................................................ 265
A. Alternative: Include an Arbitration Clause or Pursue
Mediation ................................................................................ 265
1. Arbitration ......................................................................... 265
2. Mediation........................................................................... 266
B. Provide for Dispute Resolution in the LLC Buy–Sell
Agreement ............................................................................... 267
C. Bring an Action for Oppression .............................................. 267
D. Bring a Direct Claim for Declaratory Judgment .................... 269
E. Provide for an Accounting Remedy......................................... 269
F. Action for Breach of Contract? ............................................... 271

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss2/1

2

Burkhard: Resolving LLC Member Disputes in North Carolina

2015]

RESOLVING LLC MEMBER DISPUTES IN NORTH CAROLINA

227

G. Best Solution: Permit Direct Suits if All Members Are
Joined ...................................................................................... 272
CLOSING COMMENTS ................................................................................ 274

INTRODUCTION
North Carolina has a new LLC act.1 The act includes significant
changes to the state’s former LLC structure.2 For instance, the new act
provides a framework to allow for the elimination of fiduciary duties, and it
allows LLC members to agree on alternative dispute remedies for resolving
internal disputes.3 While the act might benefit limited-liability companies
in many ways, it also raises many questions. For instance, if LLC members
assert that the managers, or those in control, have in some manner breached
fiduciary or contractual duties owed to the complaining members or to the
LLC, how will lawyers handle such claims?
This Article first notes that it may be difficult for an LLC member to
demonstrate that she is owed a fiduciary duty, and even if this can be
demonstrated, she may be required to pursue her claim through a derivative
lawsuit. This Article considers the new derivative procedures, with a
particular focus on problems that may come up in pursuing derivative
claims. The Article concludes by suggesting ways to avoid these problems.
I.

DO LLC MANAGERS OWE FIDUCIARY DUTIES?

There are already thousands of reported cases across the country
involving disputes among members and managers of LLCs. A large
number of those cases raise breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.4 Managers
have been sued for breaching their duty of care,5 and for various breaches
of the duty of loyalty, such as self-dealing.6 Assertions of “wantonness”
and other claims have been made.7 A common question in these disputes is

1.
2.
3.
4.

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57D-1-01 to -11-03 (amended 2014).
Id. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (repealed 2013).
See id. §§ 57D-2-30(b)(6), (e) (amended 2014).
See 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES §§ 9:1 to :8, at 517–85, §§ 10:1 to :4, at 639–77 (2d ed.
2015) (listing myriad reported cases involving disputes among members and managers).
5. See id. § 9:2, at 525–31 (citing numerous cases in the notes to the section).
6. See id. § 9:3, at 531–39 (citing numerous cases in the notes to the section).
7. See, e.g., Polk v. Polk, 70 So. 3d 363, 374 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (citing Jordan v.
Holt, 608 S.E.2d 129, 131–32 (S.C. 2005)).
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whether a duty is owed to the LLC, to the members, or to both.8 Similar
disputes have popped up in North Carolina, and it is likely that even more
of these arguments will arise as more LLCs are formed in the state.
A. Fiduciary Duties Created by Status
Unlike in many states,9 neither members nor managers of LLCs in
North Carolina owe fiduciary duties to each other based on their status
alone. Members, like shareholders, owe no fiduciary duties to one
another.10 Managers, like directors, also owe no fiduciary duties to the
individual members.11
Other states with similar statutes have likewise concluded that since
their statute mandates only manager duties to the LLC, it intentionally
negates any duties to the members.12 Although the wording of the North
8. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:4, at 666–69.
9. In 2013, the Delaware legislature adopted an amendment to section 18-1104 of the
Delaware Code “to confirm that in some circumstances fiduciary duties not explicitly
provided for in the limited liability company agreement apply. For example, a manager of a
manager-managed limited liability company would ordinarily have fiduciary duties even in
the absence of a provision in the limited liability company agreement establishing such
duties.” H.B. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013); see also 2 F. HODGE
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 6:18, at 6-40 (rev. 2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter O’NEAL
& THOMPSON, OPPRESSION] (“Newer LLC statutes state unequivocally that members of a
LLC owe each other fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Where statutes are silent or
incomplete, most courts have held duties owed to members as well as the entity.” (citations
omitted)); RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, §§ 9:1 to :8, at 517–85, §§ 10:1 to :4, at
639–77.
10. Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 133, 137 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (citing
Freese v. Smith, 428 S.E.2d 841, 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)); see also Selvidio v. Gillespie
(In re Gillespie), Ch. 11 Case No. 10-30942, Adv. No. 10-3187, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1261,
at *11–13 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2012) (applying Kaplan to reject a direct claim
brought by a member against the key managing member). But see Norman v. Nash Johnson
& Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 260 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“[O]ur cases have
consistently held that majority shareholders in a close corporation owe a ‘special duty’ and
obligation of good faith to minority shareholders.”).
11. Kaplan, 675 S.E.2d at 137 (citing, as authority, a number of corporation cases,
including Governors Club, Inc. v. Governors Club Ltd. P’ship, 567 S.E.2d 781, 786−87
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002)); see also Lake House Acad. for Girls LLC v. Jennings, No. 11 CVS
1666, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 41, at *21−24 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2011) (discussing the
Kaplan principles and noting that a member–manager might not be able to limit her
fiduciary duties by resigning as a manager, since the LLC agreement stated that all members
were automatically managers, and defendant retained her membership interest).
12. See, e.g., Price v. Smith, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1115 (E.D. Wis. 2012); Dawson v.
Delisle, No. 283195, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 1553, at *9−11 (Mich. Ct. App. July 21,
2009); Remora Invs., L.L.C. v. Orr, 673 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Va. 2009); WAKA, LLC v.
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Carolina statute has been slightly changed in the new 2013 act, it is clear
that no substantive change is intended; the drafters continue to assume that
any fiduciary duties created by being in charge of the LLC are owed only
to the entity.13 This is likely further confirmed by new section 57D-2-32,
which implies that if fiduciary or contractual duties are not set forth in the
operating agreement, they do not exist.14 However, could a plaintiff
convince a court “that despite the comprehensive nature of the LLC Act,
LLC members retain the ability to sue for damages based on common law
claims such as repudiation or breach of contract and breach of fiduciary
duty”?15
It is also important to remember that historically, applying the
internal-affairs doctrine, the law of the jurisdiction where the LLC is
formed will determine whether a duty exists and whether that duty was
breached.16 However, one of the 2013 changes to the North Carolina LLC

Humphrey, No. 2006-14305, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 96, at *7−10 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 2, 2007);
cf. Rivers v. Wachovia Corp., 665 F.3d 610, 617 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that with respect to
the parallel North Carolina corporate statute, the legislature intentionally deleted the word
“shareholders” to negate any inference that there is a duty running from directors to
shareholders; however, there was never a similar modification of the LLC statute); Halebian
v. Berv, 931 N.E.2d 986, 992 (Mass. 2010) (“However, the maxim of negative
implication—that the express inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another—
‘requires great caution in its application.’” (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:25, at 429 (7th ed.
2007))). Contra Internal Med. All., LLC v. Budell, 659 S.E.2d 668, 673−74 (Ga. Ct. App.
2008) (finding that managing members owe duties to members, even though the statute only
mentions duties to the LLC); T-WOL Acquisition Co. v. ECDG S., LLC, 725 S.E.2d 605,
617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“However, directors and officers of a corporation owe a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and the shareholders.” (citing Meiselman v. Meiselman, 295 S.E.2d
249, 259 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), modified and aff’d, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983))).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57D-3-21(b)–(c) (amended 2014).
14. Id. § 57D-2-32 (stating that the primary purpose of this new section is to permit the
creation of remedies that might not otherwise be enforceable).
15. OLP, L.L.C. v. Burningham, 225 P.3d 177, 181 (Utah 2009). In addition to
determining that Utah’s LLC act did not preempt the member’s common-law rights, the
Utah Supreme Court also stated that the member in that case was not required to pursue his
claims pursuant to the LLC act dissolution procedures, and that the member’s remedies were
not limited by the provisions of the LLC act. Id. at 181–82; cf. Willard v. Moneta Bldg.
Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999) (stating that the LLC statute, which provides
that directors shall act in the best interest of the corporation, “does not abrogate the common
law duties of a director”).
16. See, e.g., Hamby v. Profile Prods., L.L.C., 652 S.E.2d 231, 235 (N.C. 2007) (citing
former section 57C-7-01 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which provided that the
liability of an LLC’s members or managers is governed by the laws of the state of
formation).
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statute conceivably could bring that into question.17
B. Fiduciary Duties Created in “Fact”
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined a fiduciary
relationship as one in which “there has been a special confidence reposed
in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and
with due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence.”18 Such a
duty “extends to any possible case in which a fiduciary relationship exists
in fact, and in which there is confidence reposed on one side, and resulting
domination and influence on the other.”19 This is consistent with similar
statements found in other jurisdictions.20
17. Nelson v. All. Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, No. 11 CVS 3217, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 39, at
*26 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2013) (relying on language in former section 57C-7-01 of the
North Carolina General Statutes to conclude that the law of the state of formation controls),
appeal dismissed, 761 S.E.2d 755 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). The section of the General Statutes
on which Nelson relied has since been repealed. See Act of June 19, 2013, ch. 157, sec. 1,
2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 387, 387 (repealing chapter 57C of the North Carolina General
Statutes). New section 57D-7-05(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes, effective as of
January 1, 2014, retains language that a foreign LLC “has the same but no greater rights and
has the same but no greater privileges as, and is subject to the same duties, restrictions,
penalties, and liabilities now or later imposed on [a North Carolina] LLC of like character.”
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-7-05(c). Does this language, coupled with the repeal of the
language that one might look to the state of formation to determine the liabilities of a
manager, suggest that courts should now apply the principle that “[f]or actions sounding in
tort, the state where the injury occurred is considered the situs of the claim”? Nelson, 2013
NCBC LEXIS 39, at *25 (alteration in original) (quoting Boudreau v. Baughman, 368
S.E.2d 849, 854 (N.C. 1988)); cf. Associated Packaging, Inc. v. Jackson Paper Mfg. Co.,
No. 10 CVS 745, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *10–24 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2012) (stating
that the choice-of-law provision in an LLC operating agreement did not govern the alleged
tort and securities violations—both claims were controlled by the lex loci doctrine, with the
court providing extensive analysis as to how to determine the situs of each of the two
claims).
18. Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (N.C. 2001) (quoting Abbitt v. Gregory, 160
S.E. 896, 906 (N.C. 1931)).
19. Id. at 707–08 (quoting Abbitt, 160 S.E. at 906).
20. See, e.g., Berman v. Sugo LLC, 580 F. Supp. 2d 191, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting
that in order to determine if a fiduciary relationship exists, “New York courts typically focus
on whether one person has reposed trust or confidence in another who thereby gains a
resulting superiority or influence over the first”); Tully v. McLean, 948 N.E.2d 714, 739–40
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“A fiduciary relationship exists where, by reason of friendship, agency,
or business association and experience, trust and confidence are reposed by one party in
another and the latter party gains an influence and superiority over the first as a
result. . . . The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that one party is dominated by another;
the presence of a significant degree of dominance and superiority.” (first citing Maercker
Point Villas Condo. Ass’n v. Szymski, 655 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (1995); then citing Lagen v.
Balcor Co., 653 N.E.2d 968, 975 (1995))); cf. McKee v. James, No. 09 CVS 3031, 2013
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One court noted this in the LLC context,21 but also stated that “[o]nly
when one party figuratively holds all the cards—all the financial power or
technical information, for example—have North Carolina courts found that
the special circumstance of a fiduciary relationship has arisen.”22
The operating agreement could obviously impose fiduciary duties on
the managers to the members.23 A party may also create a “special duty” to
an LLC member that the member can enforce by behavior24 or by
contract.25
Although the drafters of the new LLC act have attempted to limit the
imposition of non-bargained-for fiduciary duties, given that most LLCs are
closely held,26 it will not be surprising if North Carolina courts find that the
relationships among those in these entities, often operating similar to a
partnership, mandate the finding of fiduciary duties among the managers
and members.27 Likewise, the courts may ultimately conclude that, similar
NCBC LEXIS 33, at *20–21 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 24, 2013) (stating that the plaintiff could
not show a long-standing, personal relationship that might create a fiduciary duty, but
finding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a special duty from majority shareholder to
minority shareholder to allow the claim of breach of fiduciary duty to withstand dismissal);
Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 177 (Tex. 1997) (holding that, at
least in Texas, in order to impose an informal fiduciary duty in a business transaction, the
special relationship of trust and confidence must exist “prior to, and apart from, the
agreement made the basis of the suit” (citing Transp. Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269,
280 (Tex. 1995))).
21. Morris v. Hennon & Brown Props., LLC, No. 1:07CV780, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55963, at *11–12 (M.D.N.C. July 3, 2008) (quoting S.N.R. Mgmt. Corp. v. Danube Partners
141, LLC, 659 S.E.2d 442, 451 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)).
22. Id. at *12 (quoting Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331,
348 (4th Cir. 1998)).
23. See, e.g., Strebel v. Wimberly, 371 S.W.3d 267, 277 (Tex. App. 2012) (noting that
where fiduciary duties are contractually owed to the “members” (plural), this should not be
interpreted to mean that the duties run only collectively rather than individually).
24. See BOGNC, LLC v. Cornelius NC Self-Storage, LLC, Nos. 10 CVS 19072, 10
CVS 12371, 11 CVS 21122, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2013)
(noting that a member’s assertion of fraud against his co-manager survived a motion for
summary judgment because factual questions existed as to whether the co-manager had a
duty to disclose and whether statements were affirmative misrepresentations).
25. Dawson v. Atlanta Design Assocs., Inc., 551 S.E.2d 877, 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
(stating that the defendant entered into a contract specifically with a member of the LLC to
design the LLC’s facility and thus owed a “special duty” directly to the plaintiff—one of
four members of the LLC).
26. See 2 CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
¶ 10.09[1], at 10-54 to -58 (2006) (explaining that federal taxation issues and illiquidity
make LLCs attractive to small groups of owners rather than large groups).
27. In Kaplan, the court was willing to consider whether to apply partnership
principles, but found that such principles should not apply in that case because the operating
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to duties owed by majority shareholders,28 majority LLC members owe
fiduciary duties to the minority members.29 The corporate opinions have
been consistent in stating that even if the defendant is able to exercise
agreement had explicitly negated any duties. Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d
133, 140 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). However, the court also stated that even if a duty had been
breached, the liability would only extend to the LLC and not to the members. See id.; cf.
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557–58 (N.C. 1983) (recognizing that the
relationship of those in a close corporation should be treated the same as a relationship
between partners); LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 28, at *13–
14 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2011).
Prior to trial, the LeCann court observed “that the parties, as fifty percent
shareholders in the Entities, acted more as partners than shareholders.” Id. Further,
“[g]iven the nature of the professional relationship between the parties, the organization of
the Entities and the fact that both parties contend they owed the other a fiduciary duty of
care,” the court concluded “that there exist[ed] one or more genuine issues of material fact
as to whether Defendant Cobham owed Plaintiff a special duty under the first exception to
the Barger rule.” Id. Accordingly, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. See
id. However, after hearing the case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to
bring her individual claims within either of the two exceptions to the Barger rule discussed
infra notes 58–66 and accompanying text. See LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169,
2012 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *26–28 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012); see also BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, ¶ 10.09[3][b], at 10-65 to -70 (discussing cases and supporting
policies that have recognized (in some circumstances) that managers and members owe
fiduciary duties, often based on comparison to partnership and close-corporation principles).
28. See Farndale Co. v. Gibellini, 628 S.E.2d 15, 19–21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (“In
North Carolina, it is well established that a controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to
minority shareholders.” (quoting Freese v. Smith, 428 S.E.2d 841, 847 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993))); Oakeson v. TBM Consulting Grp., Inc., No. 08 CVS 3884, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 34,
at *17–20 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009) (applying North Carolina law and noting that
since 1908, courts have applied the principle that majority shareholders owe fiduciary duties
to minority shareholders that will be enforced by the courts).
29. Bolier & Co. v. Decca Furniture (USA) Inc., No. 5:12-cv-00160-RLV-DSC, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26791, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2013) (stating that a majority LLC
member owes fiduciary duties to both the LLC and the minority members, and may not
deprive them of their “reasonable expectations” in the LLC); Morris v. Hennon & Brown
Props., LLC, No. 1:07CV780, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55963, at *14–16 (M.D.N.C. July 3,
2008) (citing Aubin v. Susi, 560 S.E.2d 875, 879 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (observing that
minority shareholders in a close corporation may bring a direct action when wrongdoers are
controlling directors or shareholders who have converted, appropriated, or wasted corporate
assets, so that corporate recovery would not protect minority shareholders, and stating that
this principle should be applied in the LLC context)); cf. Allentown Ambassadors, Inc. v.
Ne. Am. Baseball, LLC (In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc.), 361 B.R. 422, 462 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2007) (concluding that although an LLC manager does not owe a fiduciary duty to
the members simply by his position as manager, “[s]ince the majority members of an LLC
have a duty to its minority members and Defendant Wolff’s authority as manager . . . is
derived entirely from the exercise of powers delegated by the [majority] ‘membermanagers’ of the LLC, it follows . . . that Defendant . . . owed a duty to the LLC’s
individual members.” (citation omitted)).
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control of the closely held corporation, no fiduciary duties will be imposed
if the plaintiff actually owns 50% of the stock.30
One North Carolina Business Court judge noted that a minority
shareholder should not be presumed to have the right to directly sue a
controlling majority shareholder in a dispute regarding what best serves the
corporation “because of the freedom of contract granted to LLC members
to obtain minority protections not available to shareholders of the closelyheld corporation and because the procedural hurdles which might defeat a
derivative claim on behalf of a closely-held corporation might not defeat a
derivative claim on behalf of the LLC.”31 The court went on to note that an
LLC member does not face the corporate procedural hurdle of the
inflexible pre-litigation demand requirement, and thus, forcing the LLC
member to utilize a derivative suit is justified.32 However, pursuant to the
2013 act, the procedural rules for both LLC and corporate derivative
actions are essentially the same today.33 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina’s warning that the minority owner often does not negotiate for
protections either because of a lack of awareness of the risks, weakness of
bargaining position, assumption that disagreements will not arise, or total
inability to negotiate for protections, such as when memberships are
obtained through inheritance or by gift, is as applicable to the LLC member
as it is to a closely held shareholder.34
North Carolina courts have applied rigorous tests to determine if a
defendant “holds all the cards.” In Kaplan, the fact that the alleged
wrongdoer provided all of the financing for the LLC was not sufficient to
establish a fiduciary duty.35 In a business court decision, the judge

30. Maurer v. Maurer, No. 13 CVS 4421, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 41, at *11–12 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2013) (citing a number of opinions where the 50% ownership eliminated
the plaintiff’s claim that she was owed a special duty that would give her standing to bring a
direct suit).
31. Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *13–14 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Apr. 8, 2013). The court concluded that the LLC member’s individual claims could be
resolved derivatively, but that he still retained the right “to pursue his Meiselman claims
individually.” Id. at *18; see also Island Beyond, LLC v. Prime Capital Grp., LLC, No. 12
CVS 7351, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 48, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2013) (noting that
precedents allowing individual corporate shareholders to pursue actions do not necessarily
apply to LLC members since members, but not shareholders, can alter the statutory default
rules).
32. Blythe, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *16.
33. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01(a)(2) (amended 2014), with id. §§ 55-7-40 to
-42.
34. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558−59 (N.C. 1983).
35. Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 133, 139 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (noting
that the complaining members were experienced businessmen who had accepted the funding
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acknowledged that a single majority member might owe fiduciary duties to
a minority member, but was unwilling to combine the two defendants’
ownership shares (16% and 50%) to find that collectively, they would owe
a fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs.36 Similarly, in another case, the business
court was unwilling to find a fiduciary duty where the defendant did not
own a majority of the “shares,” even though the plaintiff asserted that the
defendant exercised control over a majority of the LLC’s “shares” and was
able to squeeze the plaintiff out of the LLC’s management.37 Another
recent opinion stated that “it does not automatically follow that a manager
is accountable to an LLC’s members for management decisions solely
because he holds a majority interest.”38
In comparison, a North Carolina Business Court judge recently
resolved a dispute among LLC members by reiterating that, in some cases,
a group of minority shareholders in a closely held corporation “may be
considered a majority . . . and that when their power of control is abused in
those instances, a minority shareholder may need to be allowed to pursue
claims individually despite the general rule that claims for harm to the
corporation must be brought derivatively.”39
An admission by a manager that he owed fiduciary duties to the
members was ignored in one opinion as an incorrect legal conclusion.40
Nonetheless, the argument can be made that this is what most managers
probably believe, and thus, the courts might recognize this as reality.

provided by Kaplan, owned controlling memberships, exercised their control, and had
asserted that they controlled Kaplan).
36. BOGNC, LLC v. Cornelius NC Self-Storage, LLC, Nos. 10 CVS 19072, 10 CVS
12371, 11 CVS 21122, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2013) (stating
that “neither own[ed] a majority interest”).
37. Yates v. Brown, No. 11 CVS 14997, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *7–8 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Apr. 13, 2012); see also Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *33–
35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2013). In Blythe, the court found that no de facto control existed
where the defendant controlled a 30% member who, in turn, had control over the LLC’s
accounting. See id. The court found that the plaintiff was a sophisticated business person
who was an LLC manager and had access to the LLC’s financial information, and thus was
not owed a fiduciary duty. Id.
38. Island Beyond, LLC v. Prime Capital Grp., LLC, No. 12 CVS 7351, 2013 NCBC
LEXIS 48, at *15–16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2013) (noting that the member’s claim for
relief was not different from that which might be recoverable by the LLC in its derivative
action).
39. Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *13–14 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Apr. 8, 2013).
40. BOGNC, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *1 n.2.
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This “reality” was confirmed in RSN Properties, Inc. v. Jones.41 RSN
Properties involved a dispute among four members of an LLC, with two
members on each side of the dispute.42 The court noted that one side
admitted that each member owed fiduciary duties to the other members.43
The parties agreed that their duties ran to each other, not just to the LLC.
One member also admitted that “a confidential relationship existed with
fiduciary duties owed to one another.”44
Although a plaintiff may have real problems in convincing a court that
an LLC manager (or controlling member) owes a fiduciary duty to one or
more of the LLC members, a few of the cases noted in this Part provide
some hope to a complaining member.
II. MAY A MEMBER SUE ON BEHALF OF THE LLC
FOR AN INJURY TO THE LLC?
What if a member of a five-member LLC misappropriates LLC funds?
How should this dispute be resolved?45
Most likely, in North Carolina, even if there are only a few members
in the LLC, courts will refuse to allow one member to pursue an action on
behalf of the LLC against a manager (or against another party running the
LLC). The North Carolina courts, based in part on former section

41. RSN Props., Inc. v. Jones, No. COA04-100, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 457, at *8–10
(N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2005).
42. Id. at *2−5. One “side” actually owned their membership through a corporation,
but the opinion continually refers to the actual owners of this corporation in discussing the
fiduciary duties that might have been owed. Id.
43. Id. at *9 (“[E]ach [member] owed fiduciary duties to the other [members] to act
with the utmost good faith in all matters and things affecting River Run [(the LLC)] and its
management and operations, which included the duty to disclose all material facts relating to
expenditures made by River Run and the assets of River Run.”).
44. Id. at *18. However, in a more recent case, one 50% shareholder (and president)
admitted in her answer that she owed fiduciary duties to the other 50% shareholder, but the
court concluded that the plaintiff had not shown that the defendant owed her a special duty
or that her injuries were separate from that of the corporation, and thus denied her individual
claims. See LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *27–28
(N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012); LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2011 NCBC
LEXIS 28, at *13–14 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2011).
45. Unless somehow modified by the operating agreement, such behavior would be a
violation of section 57D-3-21(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 57D-3-21(b) (amended 2014). Note that the former LLC statute had additional provisions
that arguably imposed more duties on the members and managers. For a discussion of these
now-repealed provisions, see Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock N.C., LLC, No. 07
CVS 20852, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 32, at *10–15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009).
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57C-3-23 of the North Carolina General Statutes,46 have routinely stated
that one member cannot bring an action on behalf of the LLC unless a
majority of the members (or the number required by the LLC’s operating
agreement) approve the filing of the lawsuit.47 In the typical dispute, the
defendants likely will own a majority of the interests and would obviously
not agree to sue themselves. But if the persons whom the plaintiff member
wants the LLC to sue are the managers or co-members, it makes sense to
disregard their votes in determining whose vote should be required to bring
the suit.48
Courts have now consistently stated, in response to a plaintiff
member’s claim that she has the right, based on inherent agency principles,
to cause the LLC to sue another member,49 that “filing a lawsuit is a
management decision not related to the company’s usual course of
business.”50 Therefore, the vote of those members or managers required by
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-23 (repealed 2013) (“An act of a manager that is not
apparently for carrying on the usual course of the business of the limited liability company
does not bind the [LLC] unless authorized in fact or ratified by the [LLC].”). The purpose
of that section was to determine when a third party could bind an LLC by the acts of a
member. See, e.g., United States v. Jorick Mgmt., LLC, No 3:09CV275, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 63201, at *2−3 (W.D.N.C. June 14, 2011) (discussing whether a manager of a North
Carolina LLC was authorized to borrow money and whether a third party knew of any
limitation on the manager’s authority).
47. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, 705
S.E.2d 757, 765–66 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33, 37–38
(N.C. Ct. App. 2008)); Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *30 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Feb. 4. 2013) (“Blythe appears to agree that bringing a direct action in Drymax’s
name would require the approval, consent, agreement, or ratification of a majority of the
managers . . . .”); see also Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC, 615 S.E.2d 1, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)
(noting that one of two members could not cause the LLC to sue the other, because a
majority vote to sue did not exist); Godwin v. Vinson, 111 S.E.2d 180, 180−81 (N.C. 1959)
(stating that a partner cannot sue “in his own name, and for his benefit, upon a cause of
action in favor of a partnership”).
48. See, e.g., 418 Meadow St. Assocs., LLC v. Clean Air Partners, LLC, 43 A.3d 607,
616–17 (Conn. 2012) (applying a Connecticut statute that specifically requires a majority
vote to sue, but likewise specifically excludes the vote of any member who has an adverse
interest, finding that in a suit by an LLC (50% owned by Barbara Levine) against another
LLC partly owned by Barbara’s husband, Barbara had an adverse interest and her vote not
to sue her husband’s LLC should be disregarded); LeCann, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 28, at *8
n.8 (“Plaintiff argues in the alternative, that even without demands, Plaintiff has standing to
proceed directly as the only disinterested shareholder since Defendant Cobham is
disqualified from acting with regard to such claims by virtue of her conflict of interest.”).
49. See, e.g., Crouse, 658 S.E.2d at 37 (“Plaintiffs rely upon agency principles to argue
that an LLC manager has ‘the inherent authority to authorize lawsuits to protect the LLC’s
interests.’ Plaintiffs [also] cite N.C. Gen. Stat. § 57C-3-23 . . . .”).
50. Peak Coastal Ventures, L.L.C. v. SunTrust Bank, No. 10 CVS 6676, 2011 NCBC
LEXIS 13, at *17 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 5, 2011) (citing Crouse, 658 S.E.2d at 37).
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the operating agreement to file suit must be obtained.51 If the LLC has no
operating agreement, only the “majority” members can bring such an
action.52 As such, if the defendants constitute a majority of those in
control, the LLC is barred from bringing a direct action against the
defendants, no matter how egregious the behavior of the defendants might
have been. One opinion has also noted that if one member is allowed to
bring an action on behalf of the LLC, what is to stop the defendant as a
member from filing a motion to dismiss the action?53 However, this seems
a much simpler way to quickly get to the merits of the dispute, rather than
wandering through the complexities of a derivative suit discussed in Part
IV. The operating agreement could give the minority the right to bring
such an action. But even though this may be a very positive provision, it
seems highly unlikely that operating agreements will be drafted to include
this power.
Former section 57C-3-23 has been deleted from the new Act, but no
substantive change is apparently intended.54 Similar wording also exists in

51. See Crouse, 658 S.E.2d at 37–38 (holding that because “the filing of an action by
one manager of an LLC against a co-manager to recover purported assets of the LLC
allegedly misappropriated by that co-manager [was] a management decision and [was] not
‘carrying on in the usual way the business of the limited liability company,’” the suit could
not be brought since it was not authorized.); cf. Stoker, 615 S.E.2d at 12–13 (noting that a
50% member could not bring counterclaims in the name of the LLC against the other 50%
member because a 51% vote would be required; the action could, however, be filed as a
derivative claim or an individual direct action (citing Glisson Coker, Inc. v. Coker, 581
S.E.2d 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003))).
52. See Brewer, 705 S.E.2d at 765–66. The court held that because a suit to recover
allegedly misappropriated assets of the LLC is a management decision that requires
approval by a majority of the LLC members, the plaintiffs, who did not constitute a
majority, did not have authority to authorize the claims brought by the LLC. Id. (quoting
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-23 (repealed 2013)). Further, the court held that the majoritymember defendants had standing to bring counterclaims against the defendants. Id.
53. Peak Coastal Ventures, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *20 n.6. The court was actually
commenting on language in the LLC’s operating agreement, but the point is equally
applicable to whether section 57C-3-23 should be interpreted as limiting the right of a
member to sue another member on behalf of the LLC. The business court also noted that in
order for the LLC to sue at the request of one member, the LLC would be required to obtain
counsel, since a “corporation[] cannot represent [itself] in a lawsuit.” Id. at *20. The
decision to hire counsel would also not be an act in the “usual course of business,” thus
additionally requiring a majority vote (or whatever the operating agreement required) to hire
counsel in order to pursue the action. Id. at *17, *20.
54. In deleting this provision, the drafters of the revised North Carolina LLC Act note:
“This section stated applicable principles of agency law. As such it was duplicative of G.S.
57C-10-03(c), which incorporates agency law by reference into the Act.” Proposed Draft to
Amend Chapter 57C of the North Carolina General Statutes at 35 n.99 (July 3, 2012) (on
file with author).
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the statutes of many other states55 and judges may continue to deny a
member the right to cause the LLC to sue on the basis that a member does
not have the implied authority nor the inherent power to sue.56 Courts may
continue to assert that such a claim requires “express” authority—the
appropriate approval of a majority of those in control or of those
individuals who are specified in the operating agreement.57 The bottom
line seems to be that if a minority member feels that those in control have
injured the LLC, she will be unable to pursue a direct claim on behalf of
the LLC.
III. WHAT IF A MANAGER BREACHES A DUTY OWED
DIRECTLY TO A MEMBER?
As noted above, even though one’s status as a manager does not create
duties to the members, a manager (or member) may owe fiduciary duties to
members based on the behavior and relationship between the manager and
members. If the manager (or, for example, a controlling member) does
breach a duty owed specifically to the member, can the injured member
directly sue and recover for her injuries?
A. Barger Rule
The first restriction on the member’s ability to bring a direct suit to
recover for injuries suffered as a member is the Barger rule, which
provides that shareholders and limited partners may not bring an individual
action against a third party for an injury directly affecting the individual, if
the entity has a cause of action arising out of the same wrong.58 This
common-law limitation has been carried over into the world of LLCs.59
Under the Barger rule, the individual may bring a direct action only if
she can show either (1) that the wrongdoer owed her a special duty,60 or (2)
55. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301(a)(2), 6B U.L.A. 585 (2014). The 1996 act has
been adopted in eight states and in the Virgin Islands. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, 6B
U.L.A. 93 (West Supp. 2014).
56. Cf. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:2, at 646–47.
57. Id.
58. Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 488 S.E.2d 215, 220 (N.C. 1997); see also
Energy Inv’rs Fund, L.P. v Metric Constructors, Inc., 525 S.E.2d 441, 444–45 (N.C. 2000);
BDM Invs. v. Lenhil, Inc., No. 11 CVS 449, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *27–28 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Jan. 18, 2012) (noting that the Barger rule applies to general partnerships).
59. See Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *15–17 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2013).
60. See Morris v. Hennon & Brown Props., LLC, No. 1:07CV780, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55963, at *17–18 (M.D.N.C. July 3, 2008) (finding that a member failed to make
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that the injury suffered by the individual is separate and distinct from the
injury sustained by the other shareholders or partners, or by the entity
itself.61 A few cases have found this special duty (entitling an individual
member to a direct suit) where the defendant is the controlling owner.62
The exception is unlikely to extend to a plaintiff who is a 50% owner being
controlled by the other 50% owner.63 A 50% “minority” owner does not
face insurmountable hurdles posed by suing derivatively, since she can
automatically create a deadlock, which will afford her greater opportunity
to bring a direct suit for dissolution.64

any allegations of a special duty owed only to the member and refusing to assume that
former section 57C-3-22(b) created a duty); McKee v. James, No. 09 CVS 3031, 2013
NCBC LEXIS 33, at *19–20 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 24, 2013) (finding a special duty by
virtue of longstanding personal relationship could not be asserted because the plaintiffs only
knew the defendants for four months).
61. McKee, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 33, at *21 n.8 (“[T]he allegations also reveal a separate
and distinct injury. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that, in addition to the injuries they
sustained as shareholders, they also lost their positions as managers and officers of the
company.”); LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *27–28
(N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012) (discussing that the plaintiff suffered a fiscal injury, but that
it was the proximate result of her status as a shareholder, and thus, she failed to meet the
requirement of either exception); Regions Bank v. Reg’l Prop. Dev. Corp., No. 07 CVS
12469, 2008 NCBC LEXIS 8, at *13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2008). In Regions Bank, a
member failed to plead a separate and distinct injury by asserting that alleged wrongful acts
forced the member to agree to a modification of the LLC operating agreement and to an
improper payment of $600,000 to other members, thus reducing its equity in the LLC. Id. at
*14. The claim was, in reality, a claim that members wrongfully diverted LLC assets—an
entity claim. Id. at *14–15. Treating this as an individual claim could impair the rights of
creditors. Id. at *15.
62. See, e.g., Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 258–59
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000); McKee, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 33, at *19 (holding that a special duty
runs to those who are powerless because of the legal impediments to their dissolving the
company or because a derivative recovery will be in the hands of the wrongdoers, but also
that the court must consider both the impact of an individual owner’s recovery on the
business creditors and the danger of multiple lawsuits). But see Blythe, 2013 NCBC LEXIS
17, at *15–20 (finding that the black-letter rule was not established, and noting that cases
turn on particular facts).
63. See Mauer v. Mauer, No. 13 CVS 4421, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 41, at *11–12 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Aug. 23 2013) (first citing Allen v. Ferrera, 540 S.E.2d 761, 766 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000); then citing Outen v. Mical, 454 S.E.2d 883, 885–86 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)). Contra
LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 28, at *13–14 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Aug. 2, 2011) (finding in LeCann the exception based more on the fact that 50/50
shareholders operated as partners).
64. Mauer, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 41, at *11–12; see also supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
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Questions have been raised regarding when the defendant is a “third
party” that triggers these two limitations.65 Delaware, the Revised Uniform
LLC Act of 2006, and the ABA’s Revised Prototype LLC Act have all
recently rejected the requirement that the plaintiff’s injury must be distinct
from those of the other shareholders for the plaintiff to bring a direct suit.66
B. Second Restriction
In addition to the limitations imposed by the Barger rule, former
section 57C-3-30(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes, as applied by
the North Carolina courts, imposed another restriction on the ability of a
member to bring a direct suit to recover for her individual injuries.67 The
purpose of this statute is reasonably self-evident—a member is not liable
for the wrongs of the LLC merely by being a member, and thus should not
be joined in any action unless the member is suing or being sued by the
LLC.68 However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals greatly expanded
the reach of former section 57C-3-30(b) as authority to limit an LLC
member’s right to bring an individual direct claim for breach of fiduciary
duty against another member or manager. Because the language of this

65. Norman, 537 S.E.2d at 253; cf. Gaskin v. J.S. Procter Co., 675 S.E.2d 115, 119–21
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that Norman did not create a new special exception as to when
a minority shareholder or member might be entitled to bring an individual direct action).
66. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036, 1038–39 (Del.
2004); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 901 (amended 2013), 6B U.L.A. 522 (2014)
(this is the model that the North Carolina drafters used and intentionally omitted this
provision); REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 909(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); see
also Marcoux v. Prim, No. 04 CVS 920, 2004 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *35 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr.
16, 2004) (cautiously concluding that the plaintiff’s class action challenge to a merger was a
direct claim, since the injury was the shareholders receiving less than they should; “[t]he
treasury of the shareholder is depleted, not the treasury of the corporation”).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-30(b) (repealed 2013) (providing that “[a] member of a
limited liability company is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a limited liability
company, except where the object of the proceeding is to enforce a member’s right against
or liability to the limited liability company”).
68. Page v. Roscoe, LLC, 497 S.E.2d 422, 428 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a
claim against the LLC was proper, but disallowing a suit against a member of the LLC who
did not engage in any improper acts); see also Selvidio v. Gillespie (In re Gillespie), Ch. 11
Case No. 10-30942, Adv. No. 10-3187, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1261, at *12–13 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2012). The court in Selvidio held that a suit “against an individual
member of an LLC in an attempt to collect money owed [to] the LLC [by] another member
[was] a violation of North Carolina law.” Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-30(b)
(repealed 2013)). The plaintiff lacked standing to sue because she had not “asserted the
existence of a special duty owed by [the defendant manager] that [was] personal, separate,
and distinct from the duty that [the defendant] owed the company,” and her claim should
have been brought as a derivative suit. Id.
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statute has been adopted in at least seventeen other states,69 the implication
of the following North Carolina decisions may still have substantial impact
in these other states, which, in some instances, similarly applied their
statute as a limitation.70
In Crouse v. Mineo,71 one member of a two-member LLC law firm
attempted to directly assert that the other LLC member breached fiduciary
duties that amounted to unfair or deceptive acts, since the defendant had a
special relationship of trust and confidence with the plaintiff that
constituted a fiduciary relationship by virtue of their membership in the
LLC.72 The court agreed with the defendant’s argument that former section
57C-3-30(b) barred the plaintiff’s claims because “[a]ll of the allegations
alleging breach of fiduciary duty . . . relate[d] to the parties’ relationship
through [the law firm].”73 Because the claims were through the LLC, they
had to be brought on behalf of the LLC; the plaintiff, as only one member,
was not authorized to sue on behalf of the LLC. Interestingly, the court
allowed the plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim against the defendant,

69. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-305 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(j)
(2003 & Supp. 2014); IND. CODE § 23-18-3-5 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(C)
(2013); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-302 (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 79-29-311(2) (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 347.069(1) (2000 & Supp. 2014); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 86.381 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-14 (2014); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW
§ 610 (McKinney 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-133 (2012); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 8991(b) (2001 & Supp. 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-70 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 47-34A-201 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-114(c) (2012); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1020 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 183.0305 (2014).
70. United States v. All Funds in the Account of Prop. Futures, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d
1305, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing FLA. STAT. § 608.462 (2014)). The court explained that
the minority members of an LLC could not challenge a government civil forfeiture of
property owned by the LLC. The members had no standing, since they had no direct
ownership interest in the forfeited LLC property, and thus, they were “not a proper party to
proceedings by an LLC.” Id.; see also Baron v. Rocketboom, LLC, Nos. 4777N,
601066/07, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9352, at *1–2 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 9, 2008)
(noting that a similar statute prohibited LLC member from intervening); Katz v. Katz, No.
2007-06043, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS, at *7 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 14, 2008) (applying a
similar statute to hold that a husband could not individually bring an action against his
former wife asserting that she was wrongly occupying a home owned by the husband’s
LLC), rev’d in part on other grounds, El-Dehdan v. El-Dehdan, No. 2011-09178, 2013 N.Y.
App. Div. LEXIS 8347, at *23–24 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 18, 2013); 450 W. 14th St. Corp. v.
40-56 Tenth Ave. L.L.C., No. 602527/00, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 98, at *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 28, 2001) (holding that “a member of a company . . . is not a proper party to an action
against the company”).
71. Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
72. Id. at 42.
73. Id. at 41–42.
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essentially finding that it was not based on rights derived through the
parties’ membership in the LLC.74
In 2011, the North Carolina Court of Appeals again confirmed that
former section 57C-3-30(b) effectively prevented members from bringing
individual direct claims against another member or manager where the
claims were based on the duties that arose as part of the LLC—as certainly
most all breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims will be.75
C. New Law—Same Result?
The limitations of the Barger rule continue to apply after the adoption
of the revised LLC act. However, since former section 57C-3-30(b) has
been deleted from the new LLC act, will this mean that, assuming there is
an individual duty created through the LLC relationship and that the duty
was breached, the injured member can now bring a claim directly? There
is no comparable provision in the 2013 LLC act, and the only provision
that may be remotely related is section 57D-2-32, which permits duties and
expands remedies to be provided in the operating agreement.76 Will courts
look to new section 57D-2-32 not only as a possible limitation on the
creation of common-law fiduciary duties, but also as a limitation in the
74. Id. It should be noted that the defendant asserted that the LLC only existed as a
marketing tool, and that only cases obtained through it would be shared. See Brief of
Defendant-Appellee at 4–7, Crouse, 658 S.E.2d 33 (No. COA07-344). The defendant
asserted that no cases were obtained by the LLC and that the cases in question were never
handled by the LLC. Id. As such, the plaintiff would have no rights to any fees under any
theory asserted by him.
75. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, 705
S.E.2d 757, 766 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). The court of appeals also concluded that the
plaintiffs’ accounting claim should likewise be dismissed: “[a]s this duty is also ‘relate[d] to
the parties’ relationship’ as part of the PLLC, it is not a proper individual claim pursuant to
Crouse.” Id. at 767 (second alteration in original) (quoting Crouse, 658 S.E.2d at 42).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-2-32 (amended 2014). The statute provides:
(a) An operating agreement may subject interest owners and other persons who
are parties to or otherwise bound by the operating agreement to specified remedies
for breach of the operating agreement or the occurrence of a specified event. Such
remedies may include the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees, the assessment
of interest without the assessment being subject to the laws of usury, and the
imposition of penalties that would otherwise be unenforceable as stipulated or
liquidated damages.
(b) Unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, an interest owner or
other person who is a party to or bound by the operating agreement will not be
liable to the LLC or an interest owner or other person who is a party to the
operating agreement for that person’s reliance on the provisions of the operating
agreement.
Id.
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manner that any such duties may be enforced? Nothing in this new section
specifically provides such a limitation, but only time will tell how it may be
applied. The failure of the legislature to adopt section 9.01 of the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act, which specifically permits a member to
bring a direct action, is certainly a signal that such actions continue to be
disfavored, absent specific authorization in the LLC operating agreement.77
IV. DERIVATIVE SUITS AS THE SOLUTION?
A. When Is a Derivative Suit Permitted?
The LLC member who believes that she has been injured, but cannot
bring a direct suit, may almost always bring a derivative action, no matter
how cumbersome,78 even though the North Carolina Court of Appeals has
pointed out that this is an inappropriate method for resolving disputes
among members of a closely held business.79
New section 57D-3-21(b) continues to require each manager to
discharge her duties “(i) in good faith, (ii) with the care an ordinary prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, and
(iii) subject to the operating agreement, in a manner the manager believes
to be in the best interests of the LLC.”80 If she fails in these duties, the
LLC has standing to complain.81 However, these duties can be modified or
possibly eliminated by a contrary provision in the operating agreement.82
New sections 57D-8-01 through 57D-8-07 of the North Carolina General

77. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 901 (amended 2013), 6B U.L.A. 522 (2014).
The North Carolina drafters initially considered this revised uniform act as a model or
guide, and omitted this provision. See supra note 54.
78. See, e.g., Peak Coastal Ventures, L.L.C. v. SunTrust Bank, No. 10 CVS 6676, 2011
NCBC LEXIS 13, at *21–22 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 5, 2011).
79. See Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 258–60 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2000).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-3-21(b). Unlike the leading State of Delaware, and many
other states that impose liability only if the director acted in a grossly negligent manner,
North Carolina corporate directors and presumably North Carolina managers operating
under identical statutory language may be liable if they merely act negligently. See FDIC v.
Willetts, 882 F. Supp. 2d 859, 868 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (“[T]he Court finds that its holding that
the corporation may bring suit against its directors and officers for ordinary negligence is
not clearly erroneous.”).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57D-8-01 to -07.
82. See id. § 57D-2-30(b). This section lists those provisions that the operating
agreement may not “supplant, vary, disclaim, or nullify.” Id. Section 57D-3-21(b) is not
included in this list of mandatory provisions. Id.
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Statutes authorize LLC members to bring derivative suits if all the required
conditions discussed in Section C of this Part are met.83
B. Whose Law Controls?
It is well established that whether a plaintiff’s claim for breach of a
fiduciary duty may be brought directly or must be brought derivatively is
clearly governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the LLC is
organized.84 Likewise, the LLC’s state of organization governs whether the
managers are liable to the members.85 It is less clear which aspects of the
derivative requirements of the foreign state should be applied in pursuing
the derivative claim in North Carolina.86
In Scott v. Lackey,87 the business court applied Delaware law in
determining whether the plaintiff was an “adequate” party.88 Should the
court have applied Delaware law, since there was no adequacy requirement
for a plaintiff to pursue a derivative action under North Carolina law?89
Prior to the 2013 amendments, North Carolina Business Court judges
stated that they would follow the Delaware “procedural prerequisites” if the
LLC was a Delaware LLC.90 The new North Carolina LLC statute, similar

83. Id. §§ 57D-8-01 to -07; see also infra notes 93–111 and accompanying text.
84. Maurer v. SlickEdit, Inc., No. 04 CVS 10527, 2005 NCBC LEXIS 2, at *12 (N.C.
Super. Ct. May 16, 2005) (“Under North Carolina law, if a derivative claim is asserted
against a foreign corporation the courts of this state look to the laws of the state in which the
company is incorporated to determine the procedural prerequisites and whether the claim is
derivative or individual.”); see also Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the
Law of Limited Liability Companies, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 70 n.20 (2006) (listing cases
that have applied the rule).
85. Hamby v. Profile Prods., L.L.C., 652 S.E.2d 231, 235 (N.C. 2007).
86. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2:13, at 235–58, § 4:2, at 354–84 (2014) (discussing choice-of-law issues that
arise in shareholder derivative actions).
87. Scott v. Lackey, No. 11 CVS 19560, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 60 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec.
3, 2012).
88. Id. at *2.
89. Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *31 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Feb. 4, 2013); 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17–18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2013). The court
noted that although in a North Carolina corporate dispute the derivative plaintiff must be an
adequate representative, nothing in the former LLC statute included this requirement. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 57C-8-01 (repealed 2013). The same is true under the new LLC statute, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01 (amended 2014). The business court in Blythe also noted that the
member “is not barred from bring[ing] such an action by his individual conflict of interest.”
Blythe, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *32.
90. See, e.g., Maurer v. SlickEdit, Inc., No. 04 CVS 10527, 2005 NCBC LEXIS 2, at
*12 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 16, 2005); see also supra note 84.
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to the existing corporate statute,91 now provides reasonably clear guidance
on this:
In any derivative proceeding in the right of a foreign LLC, the matters
covered by this Article will be governed by the law of the jurisdiction of
the foreign LLC’s organization except for the matters governed by G.S.
57D-8-02 [(court may stay proceedings)], 57D-8-04 [(discontinuance or
settlement requires court approval)], and 57D-8-05 [(payment of
expenses)].92

Thus, in any member dispute, the first question will be, “Where is the LLC
organized?”
C. What Are the New Required Procedures?
The 2013 LLC act has modified the requirements for bringing an LLC
derivative action.93 In an attempt to mirror the provisions governing
corporate derivative actions, the following procedures are now required for
an LLC member to bring a derivative action on behalf of the LLC:
(1) The plaintiff must first make a written demand on the LLC to
take action.94 There is no “futility” exception. The plaintiff

91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-47 (2013); see Aubin v. Susi, 560 S.E.2d 875, 880–81
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (applying the North Carolina statute rather than New York law to
determine that a derivative plaintiff could recover attorney’s fees, even though the plaintiff
was not a successful litigant).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-06 (amended 2014); see id. §§ 57D-8-02, -04, -05.
93. Id. §§ 57D-8-01 to -07; see Peak Coastal Ventures, L.L.C. v. SunTrust Bank, No.
10 CVS 6676, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *21–22 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 5, 2011) (describing
the former procedures).
94. Green v. Condra, No. 08 CVS 6575, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 20, at *16 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Aug. 14, 2009) (“A plaintiff’s failure to satisfy this demand requirement constitutes an
‘insurmountable bar’ to recovery.” (quoting Allen v. Ferrera, 540 S.E.2d 761, 764 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2000))); see also Ray v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., No. 05 CVS 15862, 2006 NCBC
LEXIS 7, at *20–24 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2006) (stating that if there is no existing body
upon which demand can be made, the plaintiff may first be required to cause an appropriate
body to be selected); Garlock v. Hilliard, No. 00-CVS-1018, 2000 NCBC LEXIS 6, at *12–
13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2000) (noting that where the plaintiffs and defendant had
conflicting interests, a demand was still required so that an independent advisory committee
could be appointed to decide what claims the corporation should pursue and against which
parties); Greene v. Shoemaker, No. 97 CVS 2118, 1998 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *12–16 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1998) (discussing the purposes of the demand requirement); cf.
Chrystall v. Serden Techs., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citations omitted)
(concluding that “demand ‘must be made upon the board of directors or comparable
authority’ and ‘making a demand on a president and corporate legal counsel is not
sufficient’”).
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must also plead that a demand was made.95 The business court
has recently explained what is required of the demand.96
(2) The subsequent action must be brought by a member.97
However, unlike the corporate procedures, an LLC member is
not required to demonstrate that she fairly represents the
interests of the LLC.98
(3) The plaintiff must have been a member at the time of the act on
which the complaint is based (or her membership interest must
have devolved on her from a member who meets this
requirement).99

95. Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 263 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000) (stating that a description of the demand is still required in pleading, but that it may
be sufficient for the plaintiff to plead that all conditions precedent to filing an action have
been performed or have occurred).
96. The court in LeCann v. Cobham explained what is required of the demand as
follows: “The form of the demand is not specified, except to require that it be in writing; but
to serve its purpose it should set forth the facts of share ownership and describe the redress
demanded with enough particularity to allow the corporation either to correct the problem, if
any, without a lawsuit or to bring its own direct action.” LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS
11169, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 28, at *9–10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2011) (quoting RUSSELL
M. ROBINSON, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW § 17.03[1], at 17-13 (7th
ed. 2009)). Further, “[i]n determining whether the demand requirement has been met the
Court must compare the derivative claims asserted in a complaint against the specific
demands a plaintiff has made prior to filing suit.” Id. at *10 (quoting Garlock, 2000 NCBC
LEXIS 6, at *9). “The demand must be made with sufficient clarity and particularity to
permit the corporation to assess its rights and obligations and determine what action is in the
best interest of the company.” Id. (citing Garlock, 2000 NCBC LEXIS 6, at *9); see also
Greene, 1998 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *9 (“The demand must be made with sufficient clarity and
particularity to permit the corporation, through independent directors or an outside advisory
committee, to assess its rights and obligations and determine what action is in the best
interest of the company.”).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01(a); see also Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock
N.C., LLC, No. 07 CVS 20852, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 32, at *19–20 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov.
13, 2009) (stating that under prior law, the plaintiff had to assert that she did not have
standing to cause the LLC to sue, and thus, a member’s minority status at least gave her
standing to bring the derivative claim).
98. See Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Apr. 8, 2013). The court notes that, different from a corporate derivative suit, under the
former LLC statute, the member did not have to demonstrate that she fairly represented the
interests of the LLC. This remains true under section 57D-8-01. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 57D-8-01.
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01(a); see infra notes 126–51 and accompanying text
(noting that a beneficiary of a deceased member will rarely have standing to bring the
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(4) The plaintiff must wait either ninety days or until the LLC has
notified her that it is rejecting the demand before she can file
suit.100 The complaint must be verified by oath.101
(5) Unless the defendants never reject the demand and do not move
to dismiss, the plaintiff at some point will be required to plead
“particular facts” that would demonstrate either (i) that an
inappropriate group102 moved to dismiss (or rejected the
demand), or (ii) that there was a failure to make an appropriate
and adequate inquiry into whether the action is not in the best
interests of the LLC.103
(6) Prior to a court ruling, the plaintiff may engage in discovery
only to the extent it is germane and necessary to develop facts

action; since the membership does not “devolve” on the beneficiary, only the deceased
member’s economic interest is transferred).
100. The statute also permits the member to bring the action earlier if irreparable injury
to the LLC would result by waiting. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01(a)(2)(iii). However, it is
highly unlikely that these grounds will be asserted. The court of appeals has stated that the
action must be commenced within ninety days after the demand is made. See Allen v.
Ferrera, 540 S.E.2d 761, 765 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 23(b) (2013); see Alford v. Shaw, 398 S.E.2d 445,
448 (N.C. 1990) (citations omitted) (“Because the rule containing the verification
requirement is not jurisdictional in nature, where the purposes behind the rule have been
fulfilled by the time the objection to a defective or absent verification is lodged, dismissal or
summary judgment in favor of defendants is not appropriate.”).
102. The motion to dismiss must be made by either: (1) a majority vote of independent
persons who have authority to cause the LLC to bring the recovery requested in the
derivative suit, (2) a majority vote of independent committee members, or (3) an
independent panel appointed by the court. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57D-8-03(b), (f) (amended
2014).
103. Id. at § 57D-8-03(d). Section 57D-8-03 states, in relevant part:
If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determination has been made
rejecting a demand by a member, the complaint must allege particular facts that if
proved would preclude the court from dismissing the derivative proceeding under
subsection (a) of this section [automatic dismissal if an independent body moves
to dismiss after conducting an inquiry]. Defendants may make a motion to
dismiss a complaint under subsection (a) of this section for failure to comply with
this subsection.
Id. The statute at this point is confusing as to when the plaintiff must plead “particular
facts,” as well as who has the burden of proof as to subsections (i) and (ii). These are
discussed more fully below. See infra notes 179–97 and accompanying text.
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that establish that the dismissal of the derivative proceeding is
unwarranted.104
(7) If the LLC commences an inquiry into the allegations set forth
in the demand or complaint, the court may stay the proceedings.
(8) In determining whether to dismiss, apparently the court only
needs to evaluate whether those acting were independent and
that appropriate procedures were followed.105 The court does
not evaluate the substance of the decision. “The court shall
dismiss a derivative proceeding on motion of the LLC if one of
the groups [designated in the statute] . . . determines after
conducting an inquiry106 upon which its conclusions are
based107 that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not

104. See ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[5], at 17-35 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing
problems created by this provision, which severely limit the plaintiff’s ability to obtain
likely needed information).
105. Cf. Madvig v. Gaither, 461 F. Supp. 2d 398, 404 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (“The inquiry of
a court reviewing the corporation’s decision not to pursue the proposed litigation is limited
to determining whether: (1) the decision was made by ‘a committee consisting of two or
more independent directors’; (2) a reasonable inquiry was conducted; and (3) the decision
was made in good faith.” (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-44(b)(2) (2013))). The LLC
statute does not require “good faith.” See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-08(a) (amended 2014);
see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2013) (“[S]ection
7.44 does not authorize the court to review the reasonableness of the determination to reject
a demand or seek dismissal.”).
106. The official comment to the Model Business Corporation Act states:
The word “inquiry”—rather than “investigation”—has been used to make it
clear that the scope of the inquiry will depend upon the issues raised and the
knowledge of the group making the determination with respect to those issues. In
some cases, the issues may be so simple or the knowledge of the group so
extensive that little additional inquiry is required. In other cases, the group may
need to engage counsel and possibly other professionals to make an investigation
and assist the group in its evaluation of the issues.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44 cmt. 2.
107. The ABA goes on to say:
The phrase “upon which its conclusions are based” requires that the inquiry
and the conclusions follow logically. This standard authorizes the court to
examine the determination to ensure that it has some support in the findings of the
inquiry. . . . This phrase does not require the persons making the determination to
prepare a written report that sets forth their determination and the bases therefor,
since circumstances will vary as to the need for such a report. There will be, in all
likelihood, many instances where good corporate practice will commend such a
procedure.
Id.
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in the best interest of the LLC.”108
(9) Unlike the comparable North Carolina corporate derivative
statute, the LLC derivative statute does not require those acting
to dismiss to act in “good faith.”109 One might wonder what the
significance of this deletion will be.110
The clear thrust of the new LLC act is to force all disputes among
members and managers to be resolved through derivative suits. For
instance, section 57D-2-30(b)(5) states that the operating agreement may
not eliminate a member’s right “to bring a derivative action under Article 8
of [chapter 57] unless the operating agreement provides an alternative
remedy, which may include the right to bring a direct action in lieu of a
derivative action or modifying the procedures provided in Article 8 of
[chapter 57] governing derivative actions.”111
Other than an action to dissolve the LLC, discussed in Part V.B of this
Article,112 nowhere else in the new act is there any provision for other
methods of resolving disputes among members and managers.
D. What Problems Are Created by the Requirement that Disputes Among
LLC Members and Managers Must Be Resolved Through a Derivative
Suit?
The
Carolina
modified
claim.113
1.

leading state treatise on corporation law, Robinson on North
Corporation Law, provides a checklist of corporate steps, easily
to fit the LLC context, that can be taken to defeat the derivative
But there is much more to consider.
The statute is procedurally confusing as to how a demand is
rejected and how a motion to dismiss is to be filed and evaluated

The statute first states in section 57D-8-01(a)(1) that the LLC shall
notify the plaintiff that her demand has been rejected, but does not say how
or who makes this decision. However, section 57D-08-03(d) implies that
any rejection must be made by independent members (or managers)

108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(a).
109. Compare id. § 55-7-44, with id. § 57D-8-03.
110. See ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[3], at 17-33 (7th ed. 2014) (“The concept of
‘good faith’ is a subjective one that modifies both the inquiry and the conclusion . . . .”).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-2-30(b)(5).
112. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
113. ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[6], at 17-35 to -37.
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concluding, after conducting an inquiry, that the derivative proceeding is
not in the best interests of the LLC.114
Unless some sort of report is furnished to the plaintiff, she likely will
have no information as to whether the two requirements have been met.
How will the plaintiff know whether she must plead facts to contest either
issue? Luckily, limited discovery may be permitted,115 but again, in a
confusing way, the statute states that the discovery could only be in regard
to a motion to dismiss.116 At this stage of the litigation, there is not even a
complaint. Note that none of this will apply if the demand is not rejected
and the ninety-day clock has run.117
At the pleading stage, the ultimate questions will be (1) whether the
rejection was made by an independent body, and (2) whether there was an
114. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(d), which requires the complaint to plead
particular facts that “if proved would preclude the court from dismissing the derivative
proceeding under subsection (a)”—that either those moving were not independent or that
they failed to make an adequate inquiry. Further, if the complaint does not so plead, this can
be grounds for a motion to dismiss. Id.
115. See ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[5], at 17-35. Robinson explains:
The [very similar corporate] North Carolina statute contains an unusual provision
stating that, prior to the court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff shall
be limited to preliminary discovery only with respect to the issues presented by
the motion and only if and to the extent that the plaintiff has alleged the required
facts with particularity. . . . This extraordinarily tight limitation on discovery was
obviously intended to control expenses and deter strike suits. It places on a party
who may have limited or no personal knowledge of some essential facts, and
virtually no source of information other than a request for record inspection, the
burden of pleading those facts with particularity, and perhaps also the burden of
proving them, for purposes of the dismissal motion. If a court concludes that this
combination of discovery limitation and burden of pleading/proof unreasonably
blocks a plaintiff whose case may have merit, the court might respond by relaxing
either the discovery limitation or the “particularity” requirement.
Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-3-04 (specifying an LLC member’s inspection rights).
Contra Halebian v. Berv, 869 F. Supp. 2d 420, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing why the
court rejects the plaintiff’s request for discovery regarding independence and reasonable
inquiry).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(d).
117. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. However, it may be possible to read
the statute to also permit the LLC to reject a demand in any manner that would be consistent
with the operating agreement, e.g., majority vote, regardless of whether those rejecting the
demand are independent. It is likely that this will commonly happen. The statute then
might suggest that the plaintiff is free to file the complaint without worrying about whether
there was a disinterested rejection or whether a proper inquiry was made. However, after
the complaint is filed, presumably the defendants could then file the motion to dismiss, and
then the plaintiff is required to plead (possibly through an amended complaint) particular
facts attacking either the lack of independence or failure to conduct an appropriate inquiry.
If the defendants fail to reject the demand, this second procedure would seem to apply.
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adequate inquiry. The burden of proof on these two questions depends on
whether a majority of the persons who have the authority to cause the LLC
to sue for the wrongs asserted in the complaint are independent. If
independent, the burden is on the plaintiff; if not, it is on the defendants.118
This raises several questions: How does the court determine who has the
burden? What is the procedure?119 Should the plaintiff assert that she does
not have the burden, since the majority of the LLC are not independent, or
should the defendants in a motion assert that they are? This certainly adds
a degree of complexity to the whole process. Note that this is borrowed
from the corporate statute, where it may often be a lot clearer whether the
board is generally independent, assuming that the board may consist of
many members who had nothing to do with an alleged wrongdoing by an
officer or co-director. With the typical closely held LLC, this is simply not
the case—this will not be the structure of the organization.
The statute also gives the LLC the right to ask the court to appoint an
independent panel.120 The immediate problem is determining who votes to
request this independent panel. Does the plaintiff have a vote? The
Robinson treatise then raises a second problem—at this early stage, there is
no court to make the appointment.121
These provisions have been adopted from the corporate derivative
statutes. Unfortunately, there is little clarification in the corporate
derivative world for how all of this should play out.122
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(e).
119. See Sojitz Am. Capital Corp. v. Kaufman, 61 A.3d 566, 574–75 (Conn. App. Ct.
2013) (applying a nearly identical Connecticut statute, noting that the decision whether the
majority are “qualified” is the threshold issue, but giving no description as to how the court
is to proceed in making this determination); Halebian, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (applying the
nearly identical Massachusetts statute, but again omitting any discussion of how to
determine who has the burden).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(f).
121. See ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[6], at 17-37. Robinson points out:
[T]he use of a court-appointed panel before actual commencement of the action
would be problematic because there would at that time be no lawsuit or designated
court in which to file the motion for appointment of the panel, thus leaving a
corporation that wishes to use such a panel with a choice of either trying to get the
appointment in a declaratory judgment action filed by it or doing only preliminary
work during the 90-day waiting period and filing the motion for appointment after
commencement of the action.
Id.
122. In Madvig v. Gaither, 461 F. Supp. 2d 398 (W.D.N.C. 2006), following the
essentially identical corporate derivative statutory required procedures, the plaintiff made a
demand on a corporation, the corporation then immediately put a special litigation
committee in place, the complaint was filed, the committee report was then subsequently
filed requesting dismissal, and the court ultimately dismissed the complaint, finding that the
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Inadvertent failure to carefully follow the rules—particularly
when the plaintiffs assume that they may proceed directly

There are plenty of instances where a member has directly asserted a
claim against a manager, not realizing that it should have been a derivative
claim. When this occurs, a court is likely to simply dismiss the claim.123
On occasion, however, courts have taken a more liberal approach and
essentially converted the direct suit into a derivative action.124 In one case,
the court of appeals noted that although the lawsuit was essentially a
derivative suit and neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants had recognized
it as such, the court was willing to proceed without addressing the issues
that might be posed by the fact that it was a derivative suit.125 Despite
these plaintiff “victories,” it seems likely that we will continue to see cases
brought directly that ultimately are deemed derivative, resulting in early
dismissals.
3.

Plaintiff is not a member at the time the action is filed or the LLC
is no longer in existence

In order to sue, the plaintiff must be a member.126 The issue of
whether the plaintiff was still a member when he sued was improperly
committee met the requirements of the statute. Id. at 402–04, 410–11. There is no
discussion in the opinion as to how the plaintiff challenged the committee’s independence or
inquiry procedurally. In Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000), again applying the identical corporate derivative statute, the court
noted that the plaintiff may not commence an action until the statutory period has elapsed
following demand, and at that point, the corporation’s independent directors may then
determine that the suit is not in the best interests of the corporation. Id. at 253.
123. Peak Coastal Ventures, L.L.C. v. SunTrust Bank, No. 10 CVS 6676, 2011 NCBC
LEXIS 13, at *23–24 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 5, 2011). The plaintiffs failed to properly plead
a derivative claim, since nothing in the complaint stated that the plaintiffs asked the
defendant member to explain his actions, rectify the wrong, or authorize suit. See id. The
plaintiffs also failed to verify the complaint. Id.
124. Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33, 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that the
complaint could support a derivative action even though a plaintiff did not intend to proceed
derivatively, since it factually asserted all of the then-required elements for a derivative
claim); see also Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2013) (“A court may employ a liberal standard to find a derivative action
on behalf of a LLC has been stated even though the plaintiff made no effort to label it as
such.” (citing Crouse, 658 S.E.2d at 40)).
125. T-WOL Acquisition Co. v. ECDG S., LLC, 725 S.E.2d 605, 609–10 (N.C. Ct. App.
2012).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-01(a)(1) (amended 2014). See generally BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, ¶ 10.07[1][a], at 10-49 n.224 (discussing situations where
persons were and were not deemed members, and thus, did or did not have standing to bring
a derivative action).
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raised in Crouse v. Mineo,127 but more serious allegations were raised in
Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v.
Brewer.128 The defendants in Brewer argued that the plaintiffs, in leaving
their law firm, had withdrawn from the firm and could not subsequently
bring a derivative suit.129 The plaintiffs countered that although they had
started their own new firm (among other indicia of withdrawal), they had
not technically “withdrawn” within the meaning of the former North
Carolina LLC statute.130 Rather, their actions caused the law firm to
dissolve.131 Thus, as the firm was in wind-up, the plaintiffs would still be
deemed members.132
The court noted that under the former statute, “[a] member [could]
withdraw only at the time or upon the happening of the events specified in
the articles of organization or a written operating agreement.”133 Because the
LLC articles apparently did not address the right to withdraw and there was
no written operating agreement,134 the three plaintiffs had not technically
withdrawn, despite having clearly “left” their old firm and started a new
one.135 Thus, they still had standing to bring a derivative action.136 The
127. Crouse, 658 S.E.2d 33. The defendant in Crouse argued that since the plaintiff
filed a petition with the Secretary of State’s Office to dissolve the LLC prior to filing his
lawsuit, he was automatically no longer a member pursuant to the North Carolina Limited
Liability Act, asserting that section 57C-3-02(3)(d) of the North Carolina General Statutes
controlled. Id. at 38. The court of appeals concluded that the defendant had misinterpreted
the then-applicable statute, and that a member only ceased to be a member under former
section 57C-3-02(3)(d) if the member itself filed for its own dissolution. Id. at 39–40.
Nothing in the 2013 act would seem to change this outcome. Further, there may be some
question under the 2013 act whether an entity that is a member of an LLC will cease to be a
member by starting dissolution proceedings.
128. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, 705
S.E.2d 757 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
129. Id. at 760.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 768 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-5-06 (repealed 2013)).
134. Id. The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that certain documents and
behavior should have been construed collectively as an operating agreement. Id. The trial
court had accepted the argument that the plaintiffs were estopped from denying that they
had withdrawn, but the court of appeals rejected application of equitable principles. Id. at
770–71.
135. Id. at 772.
136. Id. at 771–72. One reason that the plaintiff should be a member at the time she
brings suit is that only one with an ongoing proprietary interest in the entity will adequately
represent the entity’s interest—remembering that the entity is deemed the real party in
interest, entitled to any recovery. Schupack v. Covelli, 498 F. Supp. 704, 705 (W.D. Pa.
1980). The Brewer result is inconsistent with this principle, because the Brewer plaintiffs
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court also allowed both sides’ claims that the other had breached fiduciary
duties to proceed, some directly and some derivatively.137
The result in Brewer might be very different under the new LLC act.
New section 57D-3-02(a)(4) provides that a person ceases to be a member
when the person abandons all of the rights of his ownership interest except
for his economic interest.138
If a plaintiff is deemed to no longer be a member when she leaves her
law firm and sets up a new firm, under the new statute, she will be unable
to pursue even a derivative action, since only a “member” may bring a
derivative action.139 Further, if the defendant’s asserted wrongful “act or
omission” technically occurred after the plaintiff “abandoned” her interest,
the plaintiff will not have standing.140
It seems highly likely that when lawyers practicing together in LLCs
have a falling out, as described in Crouse and Brewer,141 that one or more
will simply walk out the door and immediately set up a new practice
without considering the possible ramifications that this may have on any
rights they might have to sue their former “partners.” It should be noted
that it is much more likely that if a member engages in the types of
activities that these plaintiffs carried on, such as walking out of meetings,
stating that they were quitting, forming a new firm, and writing letters
stating that they were withdrawing, the court will have no trouble finding
merely wanted their money from the LLC and had no interest in continuing with their old
firm. Brewer, 705 S.E.2d at 769.
137. Brewer, 705 S.E.2d at 773–74.
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-3-02(a)(4) (amended 2014). This provision can apparently
be modified in the operating agreement per section 57D-2-30(b), and counsel should
consider with the clients whether it should be modified when drafting the operating
agreement. A person’s ownership interest is defined as:
All of an interest owner’s rights and obligations as an interest owner in an LLC,
including (i) any economic interest, (ii) any right to participate in the management
or approve actions proposed by persons responsible for the management of the
LLC, (iii) any right to bring a derivative action, and (iv) any right to inspect the
books and records of or receive information from the LLC.
Id. § 57D-1-03(25). An “interest owner” is “[a] member or an economic interest owner.”
Id. § 57D-1-03(15).
139. Id. § 57D-8-01(a).
140. Id. § 57D-8-01(a)(1)(i). For example, as in the Brewer case, is the failure to pay the
plaintiff her share of LLC funds determined when the remaining members make initial
statements of refusal to pay, or is it at some later point after the plaintiff has abandoned the
firm and the defendants then definitely refuse to pay? If the operative event is deemed to
occur after she abandons, she has no right to pursue a derivative claim. See Brewer, 705
S.E.2d at 771–72.
141. See Brewer, 705 S.E.2d at 760; Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33, 35 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008).
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that the member has “abandoned,” either because the operating agreement
will state that such behavior constitutes withdrawal, or the court will
conclude that her actions constitute an abandonment under the statute.142
One can anticipate that in many, if not most, instances, the court will find
that their behavior is a withdrawal or dissociation, thus preventing them
from suing. There is no right to a direct suit because there are no duties
owed to them, and no right to a derivative suit because they are no longer
members. If this happens with law firms, as Crouse and Brewer
demonstrate, it will certainly occur in a non-law-firm setting, wherein the
“dissociating” members will surely have “no clue” that their behavior in
leaving has cut off any rights they may have had as former members.143 In
North Carolina and in many other states, the withdrawn member will no
longer have a right to bring even a derivative suit to try and rectify any
wrongful behavior that triggered her leaving.144
If the LLC is no longer in existence, a derivative suit will almost never
be permitted.145 Note that the fact that the LLC has dissolved does not

142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-3-02(a)(4).
143. In fact, this situation has already arisen outside of the law-firm context. See, e.g.,
Hosp. Consultants, LLC v. Angeron, 41 So. 3d 1236, 1241 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
an individual who would automatically become a member of the LLC if the controlling
party had not allegedly improperly failed to pay debenture owed by the LLC (and instead
misappropriated the needed funds), was not a member and thus had no standing to bring a
derivative suit claiming misuse of funds); Gowin v. Granite Depot, LLC, 634 S.E.2d 714,
717–18, 722 (Va. 2006) (reversing the trial court’s determination that an 80% member had
amended the articles of organization and then properly used the amended articles as a
method to terminate the 20% member, and as such, the former 20% member had no
standing to bring a derivative suit complaining about his removal); see also James R.
Burkhard, Resolving LLC Member Disputes in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, and the Other States That Enacted the Prototype LLC Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 405,
422–23 (2012) (asserting that a Massachusetts opinion wrongly concluded that a member no
longer had standing to bring a derivative suit because the LLC was dissolved).
144. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:3, at 651 n.15 (listing cases where
standing by a former member was contested); cf. Cameron v. Rohn, No. 10-126, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18986, at *9–13 (D.V.I. Feb. 14, 2012). In a law firm break-up that occurred
in the Virgin Islands, the defendant argued that the plaintiff, who had clearly withdrawn
from the LLC, lacked standing to bring direct claims. Id. Although the court concluded,
based on its interpretation of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, that the plaintiff,
as a withdrawn member, still could pursue her direct claims, id. at *12–13, it undoubtedly
could have concluded that she would have been barred from bringing a derivative claim.
145. See, e.g., Price v. Upper Chesapeake Health Ventures, 995 A.2d 1054, 1062 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“[A]n LLC whose rights have been forfeited for tax failures still
exists as an entity, but may only defend an action in court, not prosecute one.”). However,
if the LLC managers deliberately failed to file tax returns in order to defeat the plaintiffs’
standing, it would be inequitable to prohibit the plaintiff from pursuing a derivative suit. Id.
at 1066–68.
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mean that it is no longer in existence.146 In fact, the statute provides that
“[t]he dissolution of the LLC does not prevent commencement of a
proceeding by or against the LLC in its own name.”147
Another problem that is not cured by the new LLC act is that if a
member who would have standing to bring a derivative suit dies and her
membership interest is left by will to her husband or child, that person will
not have standing to bring the action. The statute provides that if a
membership “devolves” on a person, he will have standing to bring the
action.148 However, unless specifically provided for in the operating
agreement or agreed to by the members,149 the beneficiary will not be a
“member,” but a mere “economic interest” owner.150 Thus, the beneficiary
will not be entitled to bring the derivative suit. A number of states have
cured this problem and permit the beneficiary, standing in the shoes of the
decedent, to bring the action.151
4.

A plus for the plaintiffs, the new statute may make it much more
difficult for the defendants to have the suit dismissed

In the typical derivative squabble, the defendants may attempt to have
the action dismissed, likely by a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
maintenance of the proceeding is not in the best interests of the LLC.
Adopting the corporate procedures, such a motion must be made by an
independent body, and if it is not, the motion must be dismissed.152 In the
context of LLC disputes, it seems likely, as described below, that it will be
difficult to assemble an independent body, and one wonders whether the
defendants will have the forethought to utilize the option of a courtappointed independent panel.153

146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-07 (stating that the dissolved LLC goes into “wind up”
mode).
147. Id. § 57D-6-07(f).
148. Id. § 57D-8-01(a)(1).
149. Id. § 57D-5-04.
150. Id. §§ 57D-3-01(b), -5-02.
151. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1001 (2013) (stating that an assignee is
entitled to bring a derivative action).
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(b); see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44 introductory
cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2013) (noting that a motion to dismiss must be made by
eligible decision makers); see also Blake v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., No. 03-0003, 2006
Mass. Super. LEXIS 241, at *36 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 24, 2006) (“A motion to dismiss
premised upon the determination of an improperly constituted [Special Litigation
Committee] is statutorily insufficient.”).
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(f).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss2/1

32

Burkhard: Resolving LLC Member Disputes in North Carolina

2015]

RESOLVING LLC MEMBER DISPUTES IN NORTH CAROLINA

257

The Brewer case is a typical example.154 In Brewer, there were seven
lawyers in the LLC.155 Three lawyers complained that the other four had
acted improperly to deny them LLC profits to which they were entitled.156
Apparently, all four of the remaining members were in agreement not to
pay the plaintiffs.157 Although the statute states that merely naming the
four as defendants does not automatically disqualify them,158 as to the
defendants who actually made the decision not to pay, it would be hard for
a court to conclude that they are “independent.”159 They would personally
gain by not paying the profits that the plaintiffs claimed that they were
properly entitled to, and as such, they could hardly be deemed disinterested
or independent.
In LeCann v. Cobham,160 the plaintiff and defendant were each 50%
shareholders.161 The plaintiff established that the defendant had wrongfully
withdrawn hundreds of thousands of dollars from their four equally owned
corporations.162 The defendant herself obviously would be conflicted and
could not be an “independent” party entitled to move to dismiss the
complaint, and would not even have the requisite voting power to ask the
court to appoint a disinterested panel.
In Scott v. Lackey,163 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant managers
improperly diverted funds from the LLC for their own personal use, and
improperly covered up the diversion.164 Under the circumstances, it was

154. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, 705
S.E.2d 757 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
155. Id. at 760.
156. Id. at 761.
157. Id.
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(c)(2) (providing that “[t]he naming of [a] person as a
defendant in [a] derivative proceeding or as a person against whom action is demanded,” by
itself, will not “necessarily preclude [that] person from being considered to be
independent”).
159. This conclusion is supported in part by section 57D-8-03(c)(3) of the North
Carolina General Statutes, which also provides that a person’s approval of the act
challenged in the derivative proceeding or demand will not, by itself, preclude that person
from being considered independent so long as “the act resulted in no personal benefit to the
person.” Id. § 57D-8-03(c)(3). In the Brewer case, the decision not to pay the plaintiffs
resulted in personal benefits to the defendants. See Brewer, 705 S.E.2d at 761.
160. LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 58 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Nov. 7, 2012).
161. Id. at *1–2.
162. Id. at *10.
163. Scott v. Lackey, No. 11 CVS 19560, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 60, at *3–4 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Dec. 3, 2012).
164. Id. at *6–10.
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essentially impossible for the defendants to plausibly assert their
independence, thus negating their ability to move to dismiss.165
Most courts will likely determine that a manager or member is
independent if she has neither (1) a material interest in the outcome of the
proceeding (that would not devolve on the LLC or members generally), nor
(2) a material relationship with a person who has such an interest
(including a familial, financial, professional, or employment relationship
that would reasonably be expected to impair the director’s objectivity).166
The Robinson treatise defines the term “independent” as “both disinterested
by reason of not having an interest in the challenged act and objective in
the sense of not being influenced in favor of the defendants by reason of
personal or other relationships (the so-called ‘structural bias’).”167
However, both Massachusetts and Wisconsin have adopted a much
broader seven-factor “totality of the circumstances” test.168 Wisconsin has

165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Sojitz Am. Capital Corp. v. Kaufman, 61 A.3d 566, 573 (Conn. App. Ct.
2013) (applying the model act term “qualified,” which presumably means the same (quoting
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-605(a)(1), (b)(1) (2013))); see also Halebian v. Berv, 869 F. Supp.
2d 420, 444–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The Halebian court stated:
[W]hile § 7.44 [of the parallel Massachusetts Business Corporation Act] does not
define “independent,” the comments to the section do illuminate the intent of its
drafters as to the term’s meaning. . . . In the first of these comments, the drafters
observed that “[o]ther jurisdictions examin[ing] the qualifications of directors
making the determination have required that they be both “disinterested” . . . and
“independent.” The drafters explicate “disinterested” in this sense to mean “not
having a personal interest in the transaction being challenged as opposed to a
benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all shareholders generally” and
“independent” to mean “not being influenced in favor of the defendants by reason
of personal or other relationships.”
Id. (citations omitted); see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.43 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2013)
(defining “qualified director”).
167. ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[3], at 17-33 (7th ed. 2014).
168. Blake v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., No. 03-0003, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 241, at
*46–47 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 24, 2006). The court stated:
The totality of the circumstances test considers the following nonexclusive list of
factors: (1) an SLC member’s status as a defendant and whether this potential
liability is small or substantial, direct or indirect; (2) whether the SLC member’s
participation in or approval of the alleged wrongdoing was substantial or the result
of innocent or pro forma involvement or affiliations; (3) an SLC member’s past or
present business dealings with the corporation; (4) an SLC member’s past or
present business or social dealings with individual defendants; (5) the number of
directors on the SLC, such that with the greater number of directors, less weight
may be accorded to any disabling interest affecting only one director; and (6) the
structural bias of the SLC, such as whether the manner in which the SLC was
appointed and proceeded was inevitably bound to be empathetic to the defendants
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admonished that this test should be applied with “care and rigor”169 and that
the trial court must “examine carefully whether members of a special
litigation committee are independent.”170 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
noted that its test, along with the provisions of the model act adopted in
Wisconsin (and now also in North Carolina), are designed to overcome the
effects of any structural bias inherent in having members of the board pass
judgment on their peers.171
The three model act factors (adopted in North Carolina) that do not
automatically preclude a person from being independent have been held to
“not support the conclusion that the Legislature intended to set a low
threshold for the standard of independence.”172
North Carolina court opinions determining whether directors of a
Delaware corporation or LLC doing business in North Carolina are
sufficiently independent to “excuse demand” may also be helpful in
determining when a manager is deemed independent.173 Similar “demand
excused” cases in other jurisdictions suggest that it may be quite common
for the court to easily find that the defendants in LLC disputes are not
“independent.”174 For example, demand has been excused, essentially
acknowledging that the defendants are not independent, when the
managing party had an interest in both sides of a transaction, each director
received individual annual consulting fees being questioned, or when a
and therefore biased in favor of terminating the litigation. Some courts add as a
seventh factor the roles of corporate counsel and independent counsel, such that
an SLC is more likely to be found independent if it retains counsel who has not
represented individual defendants or the corporation in the past.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 89–90 (Wis. 2000). See
generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Propriety of Termination of Properly Initiated
Derivative Action by “Independent Committee” Appointed by Board of Directors Whose
Actions (Or Inaction) Are Under Attack, 22 A.L.R.4th 1206 (1983).
169. Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 91.
170. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 90.
172. Blake, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 241, at *41–42 (citing Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at
86–87); Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 81 (“[T]he circuit court and the court of appeals erred in
declaring that the threshold established by the legislature in § 180.0744 in determining
whether a member of a special litigation committee is independent is ‘extremely low.’”).
173. See, e.g., In re Pozen S’holders Litig., Nos. 04 CVS 1540, 04 CVS 1542, 2005
NCBC LEXIS 7, at *16–43 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2005); Marcoux v. Prim, No. 04 CVS
920, 2004 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *43–47 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2004) (discussing tests to
determine if directors were independent in approving a proposed merger).
174. See, e.g., Sacher v. Beacon Assocs. Mgmt. Corp., No. 005424/09, 2010 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 992, at *22–23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2010) (excusing demand against the manager
of an LLC who had self-interest in not being sued for breach of duty); see also RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:3, at 653 n.20.
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controlling member used the business’s assets to divert value to himself
and away from the controlled business and its minority owners.175
When a derivative claim is brought against the managers or
controlling members, it is certainly possible that the defendants,
anticipating that a court might not accept their motion to dismiss, might ask
the court to appoint a panel composed of one or more independent persons
to determine whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the
best interest of the LLC, in hopes that the panel will determine that the
lawsuit should not continue.176 If the panel moves to dismiss, apparently
the court must grant the motion unless the panel failed to conduct an
appropriate inquiry, with the burden placed on the plaintiff to demonstrate
the inadequacy.177 How often will the defendants resort to this procedure in
the context of a five- or ten-person LLC with squabbles as to whether one
or more members engaged in inappropriate behavior? One would assume
that this will not be a commonly used procedure. Will counsel even
consider this as a possibility?
However, for the plaintiff to effectively challenge the defendant’s
“independence,” the plaintiff often will likely have to assert essentially the
same facts that would prove the merits of her case.178
In considering these various steps, one wonders whether there is that
much difference between North Carolina’s requirement that a demand must
always be made, and those states which permit the plaintiff to assert that
demand is not required. Will the arguments as to whether the case should
proceed be at all different in the two types of jurisdictions?

175. See DEMOTT, supra note 86, § 5:13, at 703–53 (listing numerous examples of the
criteria for excuse regarding demand on directors); see also RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra
note 4, § 10:3, at 654 n.22 (listing LLC decisions where demand has and has not been
excused in LLC litigation, noting factors that likely will be similarly applied to determine if
LLC managers or those moving to dismiss are independent); 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1831, at 123–26 (3d ed. 2007). Wright explains
that a plaintiff should not be forced to “undertake a purely ritualistic act,” such as when “the
basis of [the] plaintiff’s complaint is mismanagement or fraud on the part of a majority of
the directors themselves.” Id. at 123. “Thus, a demand may be excused when plaintiff
alleges, with supporting facts, that the individual directors are the alleged wrongdoers or are
under the control of the real defendants.” Id. at 123–24 (footnote omitted).
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-8-03(f) (amended 2014).
177. Id.
178. Cf. DEMOTT, supra note 86, § 5:13, at 744–45 (noting that the Delaware approach
“requires the court to resolve dispositive substantive questions about the merits of the
litigation in the context of determining whether the demand ‘prerequisites’ for suit have
been met” before the “[f]actual issues have . . . been developed . . . through trial,” and that
the plaintiff at that point is not “entitled to take discovery to supplement his allegation that
making a demand would be futile”).
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The plaintiff may have difficulty pleading “particularized facts”

The North Carolina statutory requirement that a petitioning member
must plead “particularized facts” is a requirement that has caused plaintiffs
substantial headaches in regard to other derivative issues.179 Even if the
evidence admitted by the court demonstrates that a defendant’s motion to
dismiss should be denied, if the plaintiff’s pleadings do not meet the
requisite factual particularity-pleading requirement, the court can grant the
motion to dismiss.180
The Wright and Miller treatise explains that in the analogous pleading
of “demand futility,” which also requires “particularized factual pleading,”
“it is a good practice to provide as detailed an explanation in the complaint
concerning the lack of a demand as is possible.”181 As the Supreme Court
of Delaware stated, “[a] prolix complaint larded with conclusory
language . . . does not comply with these fundamental pleading
mandates.”182
Apparently, the plaintiff is not required to plead
“evidence.”183 The Wright and Miller treatise lists numerous cases in
which the plaintiff has attempted to adequately plead facts necessary to
justify a finding that demand should be excused. Not surprisingly, in a
significant number of the cited cases, the plaintiff failed to adequately
plead sufficient facts.184 This frequent failure suggests that it may be
equally difficult for a North Carolina plaintiff to challenge, on the
pleadings, either the independence of the alleged wrongdoing managers or
members or the sufficiency of their inquiry.185
179. See generally Alan J. Jacobs, Derivative Actions by Shareholders, in 10 FEDERAL
PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION §§ 25:111 to :144, at 270–98 (Francis M. Dougherty & Julie
R. Cataldo eds., 2007) (discussing the similar requirements for pleading particularized facts
that will demonstrate that demand is not required as a prerequisite to a derivative suit). But
cf. McKee v. James, No. 09 CVS 3031, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 33, at *24–25 (N.C. Super. Ct.
July 24, 2013) (noting that the plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity the information
that was withheld).
180. See Sojitz Am. Capital Corp. v. Kaufman, 61 A.3d 566, 576 n.16 (Conn. App. Ct.
2013).
181. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 1831, at 118.
182. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
183. See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 351 (Del. Ch.
2012) (noting that the requirement of pleading particular facts does not require the plaintiff
to plead evidence (quoting Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart,
845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004))), rev’d on other grounds, 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013).
184. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 1831, at 114 n.24, 131 n.42.
185. On the other hand, in Scott v. Lackey, a 2012 business court case, the plaintiff had
little difficulty in adequately pleading numerous causes of action against his co-managers.
See Scott v. Lackey, No. 11 CVS 19560, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 60, at *61 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Dec. 3, 2012).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

37

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1

262

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:225

A Missouri opinion suggests that the critical determination as to
whether one has sufficiently pleaded particularized facts is simply whether
the defendant knows what the action involves.186
6.

It is likely unclear how a court will determine if a proper
evaluation has been made by those seeking to dismiss

Courts may be very critical of the evaluation. In the analogous
context, when courts have been asked to review the work of a special
litigation committee, they sometimes have been very critical,187 especially
where the committee has failed to cite to specific sources to verify its
assertions.188 The Tennessee Court of Appeals suggested that the court
should examine “(1) the length and scope of the investigation, (2) the
committee’s use of independent counsel or experts, (3) the corporation’s or
the defendants’ involvement, if any, in the investigation, and (4) the
adequacy and reliability of the information supplied to the committee.”189
However, the plaintiff’s burden “is not just to show that the [special
litigation committee’s (SLC)] inquiry and report were flawed, or that
someone else might have reached a different conclusion, but that the SLC’s
‘inquiry and . . . conclusions [do not] follow logically.’”190 As the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut explained, “[t]he
shareholder demand process does not require an SLC to do litigation-type
discovery before arriving at its conclusions.”191 The defendants’ failure to
interview possible critical witnesses and obtain an independent financial
analysis may not be grounds to reject their report.192 The fact that the
defendant committee had infrequent and brief meetings, the investigation
lasted only one month, counsel reviewed documents on their own, and
limited fees were spent for the investigation may not be a basis for
186. New England Carpenters Pension Fund v. Haffner, 391 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2012) (quoting Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 865 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985)).
187. Blake v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., No. 03-0003, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 241, at
*79 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 24, 2006) (“[T]he SLC’s investigation was so lacking in
substance, scope and support as to raise serious questions about the good faith and
reasonableness of the SLC’s inquiry.”).
188. Id.
189. Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
190. Frank v. LoVetere, 363 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335 (D. Conn. 2005) (quoting MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 7.44 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2013)); see also Sojitz Am. Capital
Corp. v. Kaufman, 61 A.3d 566, 580 (Conn. Ct. App. 2013) (“Accordingly, the court may
conduct a limited review into the board’s conclusions to determine that they follow logically
from the inquiry, but may not scrutinize the reasonableness of its determination.”).
191. See Frank, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
192. Id. at 335–38.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss2/1

38

Burkhard: Resolving LLC Member Disputes in North Carolina

2015]

RESOLVING LLC MEMBER DISPUTES IN NORTH CAROLINA

263

challenging the report.193 However, in another action, a former general
counsel and his firm spent one thousand hours gathering relevant facts,
including collecting and reviewing over twenty thousand pages of
documents, in advising a special litigation committee.194
In an older corporate derivative suit, the North Carolina Supreme
Court noted that, in evaluating the procedures of a special litigation
committee, the plaintiffs must be permitted to develop and present evidence
that (1) the committee may have been unqualified to assess the “intricate
and allegedly false tax and accounting information supplied to it by those
within the corporate structure who would benefit from decisions not to
proceed with litigation,” (2) that the committee received false or
incomplete information for evaluation, and (3) that, because of those
problems, “the committee’s decision with respect to the litigation
eviscerates plaintiffs’ opportunities as minority shareholders to vindicate
their rights under North Carolina law.”195
In a comparable situation that dealt with whether the defendants
properly rejected a demand, the court concluded that it could consider
allegations of self-interest in determining if the decision was reached in
good faith and with reasonableness.196 The defendants’ refusal to meet
with the plaintiff and their assertion that they retained a stake in a claimed
improper distribution from the LLC drew into question their good faith and
reasonable investigation into the demand.197
7.

The role of the court in ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss
may be confusing

If the plaintiff files a derivative action and the defendants move to
dismiss, it may be unclear how the parties should proceed and which
standards should be applied. The North Carolina Business Court Rules
note that if “allegations of facts not appearing of record are relied upon to
support a motion, affidavits, parts of depositions, and other pertinent
documents then available shall accompany the motion.”198 In evaluating
whether to dismiss, the North Carolina court apparently should not treat
this as a simple Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and not even merely as a motion for
summary judgment, since the court must make findings of fact regarding

193. Id. at 335 n.6.
194. Halebian v. Berv, 869 F. Supp. 2d 420, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
195. Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 328 (N.C. 1987).
196. Scott v. Lackey, No. 11 CVS 19560, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 60, at *28–29 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2012).
197. Id. at *30–31.
198. N.C. BUS. CT. R. 15.5.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

39

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1

264

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:225

the independence of the moving body and whether proper procedures were
used.199
Federal courts attempting to resolve similar derivative claims have
found this difficult, requiring the court to convert what would normally be
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment (still a “step
below” the apparent North Carolina procedures).200 Both Connecticut and
Massachusetts have also adopted section 7.44 of the model act, and like
North Carolina, have noted that such a motion is not treated simply as a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.201
Georgia courts have noted that when a defendant moves to dismiss a
derivative action, the motion “is perhaps best considered as a hybrid
summary judgment motion for dismissal because the stockholder plaintiff’s
standing to maintain the suit has been lost.”202 A federal opinion noted that
the Connecticut statute contemplates “that the court will review the
plaintiff’s complaint on its face, using a heightened review standard akin to
that required in fraud cases,” since discovery is only available to the
plaintiff after she has first successfully stated a cause of action.203
However, the court will consider the plaintiff’s proffered evidence as to
whether the determination to dismiss was made independently, in good
faith, and, after reasonable inquiry, if the parties have agreed to discovery,

199. See Alford v. Shaw, 398 S.E.2d 445, 457 (N.C. 1990) (applying essentially the
identical corporate derivative statute and concluding that the trial judge, not the jury, must
hold an evidentiary hearing); cf. Thompson v. Sci. Atlanta, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 796, 798–99
(Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the company’s motion was supported by a voluminous and
detailed report for which the plaintiff failed to come forward with “evidence” challenging
the lack of independence of those requesting dismissal).
200. See Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2011).
201. See Sojitz Am. Capital Corp. v. Kaufman, 61 A.3d 566, 572 (Conn. Ct. App. 2013).
The Sojitz court explains:
Section 33-724 is distinguishable from other motions to dismiss, as it sets forth a
unique, heightened pleading standard and elements that must be either proven or
disproven. In light of these substantive requirements, other jurisdictions have
similarly concluded that dismissals pursuant to § 7.44 of the model act are
unique. . . . [T]hese jurisdictions have concluded that trial courts, in their
discretion, may issue discovery orders. In rendering judgments on these motions
to dismiss, trial courts and appellate courts have thus reviewed the entire record,
consisting of the complaint and documents submitted in support of and opposition
to the motion to dismiss—in some instances the courts have even considered and
resolved disputed factual issues.
Id. (citing numerous cases, including Halebian, 644 F.3d at 130–31).
202. Thompson, 621 S.E.2d at 799 (quoting Millsap v. Am. Family Corp., 430 S.E.2d
385, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)).
203. Frank v. LoVetere, 363 F. Supp. 2d 327, 333 (D. Conn. 2005).
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but the plaintiff must still show “with particularity” facts supporting his
allegations.204
At least two states have determined that an appeal from a trial court’s
determination to dismiss will be reviewed by an appellate court as a mixed
question of fact and law, and thus will be subject to plenary review by the
appellate court.205
Whatever procedures are followed, it is likely that this will not be a
simple matter for the court to resolve. A six-day hearing occurred in the
Alford litigation,206 and a seven-day trial was required in Wisconsin to
determine whether members of a litigation committee were independent.207
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AVOIDING THE PITFALLS
OF DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
The problems that will likely be created by the default rules in the new
LLC act suggest that counsel need to advise their clients on the possibility
of drafting around these problems or pursuing a different type of remedy.
A. Alternative: Include an Arbitration Clause or Pursue Mediation
1.

Arbitration

One obvious possibility is that the operating agreement could contain
a clause that requires all disputes among members and managers to be
resolved through arbitration. Bishop and Kleinberger point out in their
treatise that such provisions should be enforceable, but they raise some
question as to whether the operating agreement could displace or place
barriers on the use of derivative suits.208 The North Carolina statute says
that you can,209 but Bishop and Kleinberger question whether private
agreements can restrain a court’s power to do equity.210 O’Neal and
204. Id.
205. Sojitz, 61 A.3d at 572–73.
206. Alford v. Shaw, 398 S.E.2d 445, 458 (N.C. 1990).
207. See Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 83 (Wis. 2000).
208. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, § 10.07[3], at S10-54 to -55 (Cum.
Supp. No. 1 2009); see also RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:3, at 663 (“There is
significant authority enforcing arbitration as an alternative to derivative suits in LLCs.
However, the courts may interpret the arbitration clause so as to limit its application. In
general, there is a growing body of law interpreting arbitration clauses in LLC operating
agreements.”).
209. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-2-30(b)(5) (amended 2014).
210. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 26, § 10.07[3], at S10-54 to -55 (Cum. Supp.
No. 1 2009).
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Thompson point out that attempts to arbitrate matters of dissolution have
been prohibited.211
As a word of caution, arbitration can be a lengthy process. A recent
two-member LLC arbitration took eight years to be resolved.212 Maybe we
should all heed the comments of Judge Joseph F. Anderson, a wellrespected federal judge, that today’s courts can provide a much quicker
forum than arbitration.213
2.

Mediation

North Carolina LLC disputes will almost always be resolved in the
North Carolina Business Court.214 “As such, all cases . . . shall be subject
to the Rules Implementing Statewide Mediated Settlement Conferences in
Superior Court Civil Actions and such other rules or orders consistent
therewith as may be established or entered by the Business Court.”215
Although the court does not keep statistics regarding how many actions are
resolved through mediation, former Chief Judge Jolly of the North Carolina
Business Carolina has advised that even when the mediation process does
not resolve the matter, the process often provides both sides with important
information leading to a settlement.216

211. See 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCS § 9:46, at 9-303 (rev. 3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter O’NEAL &
THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS].
212. Kriti Ripley, LLC v. Emerald Invs., LLC, 746 S.E.2d 26, 27–29 (S.C. 2013)
(describing a series of arbitrations and suits starting in 2005 and lasting through the South
Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in 2013).
213. Cox v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., Nos. 3:12-cv-03333-JFA, 4:12-cv-03407-JFA,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140602, at *3 n.1 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2013).
214. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4(a)(1).
215. N.C. BUS. CT. R. 19.1. To implement the mediation, Business Court Rule 17.1(h)
requires the parties in the case-management meeting to cover “[t]he timing of any mediated
settlement conference . . . and the selection of a mediator or group of mediators.” Id. R.
17.1(h). In implementing this, the case-management order (Business Court Form 2)
specifically requires the parties to file the name of the mediator that they have selected and
to designate that mediation shall be completed by a specified date. See Form 2, at 50,
http://www.ncbusinesslitigationreport.com/Hyperlinked%20Rules(1).pdf (last visited May
2, 2015).
216. Telephone Interview with Hon. John R. Jolly, Jr., former Chief Special Superior
Court Judge for Complex Business Cases, N.C. Business Court (Oct. 3, 2013). Former
Chief Judge Jolly also pointed out that most litigation is usually settled and does not go to
trial. Id.
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B. Provide for Dispute Resolution in the LLC Buy–Sell Agreement
Every well-drafted LLC operating agreement should include some sort
of buy–sell agreement.217 It may be possible to draft an equitable buy–sell
agreement that would be triggered by a dispute among the members.
C. Bring an Action for Oppression
An alternative that may be particularly attractive in North Carolina for
an unhappy LLC member is to bring an action for oppression under section
57D-6-02 of the North Carolina General Statutes.218 The North Carolina
cases where this claim has been raised in the context of a close corporation
are particularly favorable to an unhappy member, including the widely
noted Meiselman219 opinion, which established a four-step requirement for
relief when the plaintiff asserts that the wrongful actions have frustrated her
reasonable expectations.220 Counsel for the plaintiff should particularly
217. O’Neal and Thompson outline the basic considerations of buy–sell agreements. See
O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 9, § 6:16, at 6-32.
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02 (“The superior court may dissolve an LLC in a
proceeding brought by . . . [a] member, if it is established that (i) it is not practicable to
conduct the LLC’s business in conformance with the operating agreement and [Chapter 57]
or (ii) liquidation of the LLC is necessary to protect the rights and interests of the
member.”); see also Battles v. Bywater, LLC, No. 14 CVS 1853, 2014 NCBC LEXIS 54, at
*24–25 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2014) (appointing a receiver and noting that “deadlock” is
still a ground for dissolution); Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock N.C., LLC, No. 07
CVS 20852, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 32, at *23–24 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009) (noting that
the plaintiff under the former law effectively pleaded facts that suggested dissolution was
reasonably necessary to protect the minority’s rights and that assets of the LLC were
misapplied or wasted); Reid Pointe, LLC v. Stevens, No. 08 CVS 4304, 2008 NCBC LEXIS
16, at *18–20 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2008) (reluctantly concluding that a member
adequately alleged facts suggesting that liquidation of the LLC was necessary to protect a
member’s rights). Contra Bolier & Co. v. Decca Furniture (USA) Inc., No. 5:12-cv-00160RLV-DSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26791, at *12 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2013) (finding a
minority member initially unsuccessful in asserting oppression claims); High Point Bank &
Tr. Co. v. Sapona Mfg. Co., 713 S.E.2d 12, 17–18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (finding a
shareholder unable to demonstrate that it had a substantial reasonable expectation).
219. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
220. Id. at 564 (“For plaintiff to obtain relief under the expectations analysis, he must
prove that (1) he had one or more substantial reasonable expectations known or assumed by
the other participants; (2) the expectation has been frustrated; (3) the frustration was without
fault of plaintiff and was in large part beyond his control; and (4) under all of the
circumstances of the case plaintiff is entitled to some form of equitable relief.”); see also
Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 519–21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
(illustrating how the four requirements are applied and affirming decision to order
dissolution of a closely held corporation); Foster v. Foster Farms, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 843,
849–50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (applying the analogous prior statute, the trial court failed to
make the findings required by Meiselman).
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note that by statute, an “oppression” claim is automatically a direct cause of
action, which avoids the numerous traps in any derivative suit.221 Further,
pursuant to the new LLC statute, all members have a nonwaivable statutory
right to bring an action to protect their “rights and interests.”222 It will also
be unlikely that the operating agreement will have waived the other basis
for bringing such a suit—that “it is not practicable to conduct the LLC’s
business in conformance with the operating agreement and [Chapter 57D].”223
It should be noted that because of amendments to the North Carolina
General Statutes, North Carolina courts no longer have the broad, equitable
powers to fashion remedies other than liquidation that they had when
Meiselman was decided.224 One wonders if courts will be less inclined to
determine that an LLC member has been oppressed, knowing that they
cannot simply order that the member’s interest be purchased or that the
member be provided a stream of income or some other less dramatic
remedy other than dissolution of the business. However, in one dissolution
action involving a closely held corporation, even though the court
concluded that all of the shareholders would be injured if the company was
liquidated, the court still ordered liquidation after carefully considering
what value the plaintiffs were entitled to, since the defendant, pursuant to
the corporate statute, had the statutory option to buy out the complaining
minority shareholders at the court-approved value.225 This statutory option
is available to LLCs.226 Counsel must be careful in precisely pleading the
221. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02(2) (stating that an action to dissolve is brought by a
member); see Blythe v. Bell, No. 11 CVS 933, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *23 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Apr. 8, 2013) (“As the court explained during oral argument, it believes that the
Meiselman claim is an individual claim separate and apart from the breach of fiduciary duty
claims brought derivatively by Drymax [a limited-liability company], even though they arise
from a similar evidentiary record.”). See generally Miller v. Ruth’s of N.C., Inc., 313
S.E.2d 849 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Kleinberger, supra note 84, at 120 (“Will Claims
Asserting Oppression Provide an End-Run Around the Direct/Derivative Distinction?”).
222. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02(2)(ii); see also id. § 57D-2-30(b)(7) (stating that an
operating agreement may not supplant, vary, disclaim, or nullify clause (ii) of section
57D-6-02(2)).
223. Id. § 57D-6-02(2)(i).
224. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Sapona Mfg. Co., No. 08 CVS 1065, 2010 NCBC
LEXIS 14, at *16–18 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 22, 2010) (“Former section 55-125.1 gave the
trial court the power to order alternative forms of relief. . . . After Meiselman, the
Legislature eliminated the alternative remedies to dissolution set forth in section 55-125.1.
Courts do not enjoy such broad powers under the current statute.”), aff’d, 713 S.E.2d 12
(N.C. Ct. App. 2011); see also Blythe, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *23.
225. Garlock v. Se. Gas & Power, Inc., No. 00-CVS-01018, 2001 NCBC LEXIS 9, at
*45–50 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2001).
226. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-03(d).
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member’s right to relief.227
O’Neal and Thompson’s treatises provide extensive guidance for
pursuing an oppression action.228 The authors note that the most common
claim is that it is not reasonably practical to carry on the LLC’s business.229
However, in cases like Brewer and Crouse, an oppression claim could be
equally utilized.230
D. Bring a Direct Claim for Declaratory Judgment
In Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock North Carolina, LLC,231
the plaintiff member successfully pleaded a cause of action seeking a
declaratory judgment as to the value of its membership interest and the
interpretation of the LLC operating agreement.232 Presumably, clever
plaintiffs’ attorneys could use this technique even more expansively. In
this action, the plaintiff also made a motion for the appointment of a
receiver.233 Although the court denied the request, the court provides
guidance as to when this might be appropriate.234
E. Provide for an Accounting Remedy
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion,
noted that under the former LLC act, unless modified by the operating
agreement, members of a North Carolina LLC had a statutory duty to
account for certain improper profits.235 The court of appeals specifically
implied that this statutory duty ran to both the LLC and to its members.236
In Brewer, the court of appeals, in granting the dissolution and winding up
227. Brady v. Van Vlaanderen, No. 12 CVS 7552, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 34, at *10–11
(N.C. Super. Ct. July 24, 2013) (granting the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to
provide more specificity).
228. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 211,
§§ 9:30 to :52, at 9-188 to -329; see also O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 9,
§§ 6:23 to :27, at 6-50 to -66.
229. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 211,
§ 9:51, at 9-323 (discussing LLC cases applying this principle); O’NEAL & THOMPSON,
OPPRESSION, supra note 9, § 6:24, at 6-57 to -61 (same).
230. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
231. Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock N.C., LLC, No. 07 CVS 20852, 2009
NCBC LEXIS 32 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009).
232. Id. at *15–17.
233. Id. at *29.
234. Id. at *30–34.
235. RSN Props., Inc. v. Jones, No. COA04-100, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 457, at *8–10
(N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2005) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(e) (repealed 2013)).
236. Id. at *8–9.
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of the LLC, directed the business court to address both the plaintiffs’
individual and derivative claims for an accounting.237 The business court
then appointed a special master to conduct an accounting.238 Another LLC
member was successful in pleading a claim that she was entitled access to
all LLC records and to “an accurate accounting of revenues, income, debts,
obligations, liabilities, distributions and assets.”239 Further, it seems that
often in disputes among LLC members as to the handling of the funds, an
accountant will need to sort out the LLC’s finances.240
Although former section 57C-3-22(e),241 which required managers to
“account” for any improper benefit or profit, has been dropped from the
new LLC act, this is an essential agency principle that continues to govern
LLCs pursuant to new section 57D-2-30(c).242 The new LLC act thus
essentially incorporates sections 8.11 and 8.12 of the Restatement (Third)
of Agency, both of which require an agent to account to her principal
(presumably only the LLC and not the other members), but both of these
duties may be modified.243
If one acknowledges that many LLCs actually function as
partnerships, then it may be appropriate to include in LLC operating
agreements a provision that grants the members the right to bring an

237. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, 705
S.E.2d 757, 773 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
238. Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, No.
06 CVS 6091, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 13, at *25–26 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2013).
239. Mooring Capital Fund, LLC v. Comstock N.C., LLC, No. 07 CVS 20852, 2009
NCBC LEXIS 32, at *18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009); see also Brady v. Van
Vlaanderen, No. 12 CVS 7552, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 34, at *8–9 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 24,
2013) (finding that a member successfully pleaded her right to inspect and copy LLC
records and that defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion was insufficient to challenge the breadth of
that inspection).
240. See LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *7 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012). In LeCann, the court appointed a CPA to determine the amount of
funds that were wrongfully transferred from four closely held entities. Id. Even though the
accountant was unable to complete the task since the transfers were so numerous and
improperly documented, the partial information was sufficient for the court to conclude that
the defendant had wrongfully diverted nearly $600,000. Id. at *7–10.
241. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(e) (repealed 2013) (“Except as otherwise provided in
the articles of organization or a written operating agreement, every manager must account to
the limited liability company and hold as trustee for it any profit or benefit derived without
the informed consent of the members by the manager from any transaction connected with
the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the limited liability company or from any personal
use by the manager of its property.”).
242. Id. § 57D-2-30(c) (amended 2014).
243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §§ 8.11–.12 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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accounting action in appropriate circumstances.244 This Article leaves for
another day how such a provision should be drafted.245 This is left to the
creativity of counsel.
F. Action for Breach of Contract?
The revised North Carolina LLC act is completely based on the notion
that an LLC is a creature of contract.246 The revised act specifically
provides that both the law of agency and the law of contracts govern the
administration and enforcement of the LLC operating agreement.247 Even
though the prior statute did not include a provision that the law of contracts
was to be applied in the enforcement of operating agreements,248 at least
one opinion, Crouse v. Mineo,249 granted a member the right to directly sue
his co-member on a quantum meruit claim.250 In another case, a member’s
individual claim, asserting that the managers breached their contractual
244. See, e.g., Six Corners Same Day Surgery, LLC v. Macchione, No. 11 CH 18215,
2013 WL 2145005, at *11–12 (Cook County, Ill. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2013) (recognizing an
accounting as a way to resolve aspects of disputes between LLC members). Contra
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:4, at 664–65 (arguing that accounting actions
have no place in resolving LLC disputes).
245. See JAMES R. BURKHARD, PARTNERSHIP AND LLC LITIGATION MANUAL: ACTIONS
FOR ACCOUNTING AND OTHER REMEDIES §§ 7.01–.05, at 145–84 (1995).
246. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-10-01. Section 57D-10-01 states that the purpose of the
chapter “is to provide a flexible framework under which one or more persons may organize
or manage one or more business as they determine to be appropriate with minimum,
prescribed formalities or constraints.” Id. § 57D-10-01(b). The policy of the chapter is “to
give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and the enforceability of
operating agreements.” Id. § 57D-10-01(c); see also id. § 57D-2-30(a). Section 57D-230(a) provides:
The operating agreement governs the internal affairs of an LLC and the rights,
duties, and obligations of (i) the interest owners, . . . in relation to each other, the
LLC, and their ownership interests or rights to acquire ownership interests and (ii)
the company officials in relation to each other, the LLC, and the interest owners.
Subject to the limitations set forth in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this
section, the provisions of this Chapter and common law will apply only to the
extent contrary or inconsistent provisions are not made in, or are not otherwise
supplanted, varied, disclaimed, or nullified by, the operating agreement. The
provisions of the operating agreement are severable and each will apply to the
extent it is valid and enforceable.
Id.
247. Id. § 57D-2-30(e).
248. Id. § 57C-10-03(e) (repealed 2013) (providing that the statute was to give the
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of
operating agreements).
249. Crouse v. Mineo, 658 S.E.2d 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
250. Id. at 41–42.
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obligation to manage the LLC in a prudent and businesslike manner,
survived, on a limited basis, a motion for summary judgment.251 With the
new act now specifically stating that the law of contracts governs the
enforcement of the LLC operating agreement, is it more probable that an
unhappy member may be able to successfully bring a direct claim, rather
than a derivative claim, to enforce her contract rights as established in the
operating agreement?252
G. Best Solution: Permit Direct Suits if All Members Are Joined
The leading treatise is exceptionally critical of the use of derivative
suits to resolve disputes among members and managers of LLCs.253
Ribstein and Keatinge suggest that if there are disputes among the members
and managers of the LLC, the better solution is to simply allow a direct suit
requiring all members to be joined in the action.254 O’Neal and Thompson
also have identified a growing trend to allow disputes in closely held
businesses to be brought directly.255 Although there may be no evidence
confirming the same (and such might be a topic of empirical research),
when one reads the many reported LLC member-dispute cases, most of the
cases do not seem to be “strike suits,” and thus have no need for protections
provided by the derivative procedures. However, the derivative-demand
requirement that permits the company to resolve its own problems may
prevent members from being able to bring mere power-struggle squabbles
into court, which judges suggest do not belong in court.256

251. See BOGNC, LLC v. Cornelius NC Self-Storage, LLC, Nos. 10 CVS 19072, 10
CVS 12371, 11 CVS 21122, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 1, 2013);
cf. Island Beyond, LLC v. Prime Capital Grp., LLC, No. 12 CVS 7351, 2013 NCBC LEXIS
48, at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2013) (showing that a member dropped his claim for
breach of the operating agreement).
252. See, e.g., Schultheis v. Hatteras Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC, No. 14 CVS 469, 2014
NCBC LEXIS 23, at *8–14 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 9, 2014) (concluding that minority
members’ derivative and individual claims that a manager breached the operating agreement
should be dismissed).
253. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:3, at 650–51, § 10:4, at 674–75
(listing four significant policy arguments why derivative suits should not be used to resolve
member disputes).
254. Id. § 10.4, at 677.
255. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 9, § 7:8, at 7-73; see also O’NEAL &
THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS, supra note 211, § 9:26, at 9-147 (discussing
reasons why fiduciary-duty claims increasingly can be brought as direct suits in disputes
among members of a closely held business).
256. See, e.g., Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. 3017-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at
*31 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (“[T]o find that the Court must decide whose business judgment
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In some jurisdictions, courts have applied section 7.01(d) of the
American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance to
allow one or a few members to bring a direct suit to rectify a wrong
committed against the LLC and its members.257 Courts have been willing
to allow a direct suit if all the members are joined in the litigation (either as
defendants or plaintiffs) and if resolution of the suit will not be injurious to
creditors not made a party to the action.258 Because most LLCs have few
members, in many states, it is easy to bring an action pursuant to the
teaching of section 7.01(d) of the ALI’s Principles of Corporate
Governance.259 At least one North Carolina judge has considered this
option, but ultimately found that it should not apply in that particular case
because it was unclear who the members were, and because there were
outstanding creditors.260 Another opinion effectively applied this option in
the context of a closely held corporation.261
Following the ALI’s lead, the most practical solution may be simply
to provide in standard operating agreements a clause that provides that
disputes among members (or members and managers) that cannot be settled
by mediation or negotiation are to be resolved in a direct suit wherein each
member or manager is named either as a plaintiff or defendant. This not
only simplifies matters, but it may also reduce overall costs in resolving

was more in keeping with the LLC’s best interests . . . would cripple the policy underlying
the LLC Act promoting freedom of contract.”).
257. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:4, at 675–76; see also James R.
Burkhard, LLC Member and Limited Partner Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims: Direct or
Derivative Actions?, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 19, 52–60 (2003).
258. See, e.g., Moses v. Pennebaker, 719 S.E.2d 521, 529 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)
(concluding that in a two-member LLC, one member may bring a direct suit for usurpation
of LLC opportunities); accord Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC, 615 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Ga. Ct. App.
2005) (citing Thomas v. Dickson, 301 S.E.2d 49, 50–51 (Ga. 1983)). See generally O’NEAL
& THOMPSON, OPPRESSION, supra note 9, § 6:20, at 6-44 to -45 (“One of the most notable
movements in close corporations law in recent decades has been the increased willingness
of courts to permit minority shareholders to bring direct claims for breach of fiduciary
duties. That trend can also be seen in the LLC setting and for similar reasons.”).
259. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 10:4, at 675–76.
260. Nelson v. All. Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, No. 11 CVS 3217, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 39, at
*38 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2013), appeal dismissed, 761 S.E.2d 755 (N.C. Ct. App.
2014).
261. Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 259 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000); cf. Gaskin v. J.S. Procter Co., 675 S.E.2d 115, 119–21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (noting
that the Norman opinion did not create a new special exception as to when a minority
shareholder or member might be entitled to bring an individual direct action, and also
considering the 7.01(d) factors, but noting that they were not present in this case).
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disputes.262
The Business Law Section of the American Bar Association has
recently released a Revised Prototype Limited Liability Company Act,
which provides as a recommended statutory provision that “[a] member
may maintain a direct action to enforce a right of a limited liability
company if all members at the time of suit are parties to the action.”263
This simple provision could easily be adopted in any North Carolina
operating agreement. It accomplishes all of the objectives that the ALI has
underscored as the most important,264 and it certainly seems to be in
compliance with the new North Carolina LLC act.265
CLOSING COMMENTS
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has stated that “[s]ince 1955,
North Carolina has served as a pioneer and ‘shining light’ in the protection
of minority shareholder rights.”266 As this Article suggests, that may no
longer be true. Whether this is a good or bad change probably depends on
whether the reader is a plaintiff or defense lawyer. Even from the
262. Cf. ROBINSON, supra note 96, § 17.08[2], at 17-31 (7th ed. 2014) (noting that the
advantage of permitting the LLC to request a court-appointed independent body with
authority to determine if a derivative complaint should be pursued is to reduce costs).
263. REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 909(c)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). The
Revised Prototype Act also includes two other optional provisions, providing first for a
direct suit by one member against another. See id. §§ 909(a)–(b). Section 909(a) provides:
[A] member may maintain a direct action against another member or members or
the limited liability company, or a series thereof, to enforce the member’s rights
and otherwise protect the member’s interests, including rights and interests under
the limited liability company agreement or this Act or arising independently of the
membership relationship.
Id. § 909(a). Further, section 909(b) provides:
A member maintaining a direct action under subsection (a) must plead and prove
an actual or threatened injury that is not solely the result of an injury suffered or
threatened to be suffered by the limited liability company, or series thereof.
Id. § 909(b). Second, the Revised Prototype Act, acknowledging that plaintiffs might want
to resolve disputes through a derivative suit, includes sections 901 through 908, specifying
how an LLC derivative suit should be pursued. Id. §§ 901–908.
264. All members are protected, since all are joined, and can assert whatever position
they deem appropriate; there will be only one action. Presumably, the resolution of a suit
brought pursuant to this provision would bar subsequent actions, and creditors of the LLC
are protected, since any recovery goes to the LLC, as the real party in interest.
265. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57D-2-30(b)(5), -32(a) (amended 2014).
266. Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 517 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
(quoting Robert Savage McLean, Note, Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Close
Corporation Under the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 68 N.C. L. REV.
1109, 1125–26 (1990)).
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plaintiff’s perspective, though, it is certainly not all “gloom and doom.”
Despite the expected problems caused by forcing most LLC member
disputes into the derivative mold, in analogous close-corporation
squabbles, applying essentially the identical corporate procedures that now
control LLC actions, sample cases clearly show that the plaintiff can be
very successful.267 The business court recently determined that one of the
two dentists in LeCann had wrongfully diverted $559,888 from their
practices and was thus liable to reimburse his corporations for that amount
plus an additional $1,679,664 in punitive damages.268 Cases in other
jurisdictions likewise demonstrate that LLC member wrongdoing can be
successfully rectified through the derivative suit.269
Maybe all that is really important is whether a putative plaintiff is
offered some method of bringing a claim—be it direct or derivative. Once
the action is filed, as pointed out by former Chief Business Court Judge
John Jolly, most of these cases ultimately settle.270 As long as the unhappy
member can file some sort of action, regardless of its form, maybe this is
all that is really necessary. It will be interesting to see how this new LLC
act impacts the resolution of the expected increasing number of squabbles
that LLC owners will encounter.

267. See, e.g., LeCann v. Cobham, No. 10 CVS 11169, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *32
(N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012).
268. Id. at *13–14 (noting that the defendant, as a 50% owner, would be entitled to onehalf of the award).
269. See, e.g., Tully v. McLean, 948 N.E.2d 714, 729 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (demonstrating
that the court may remove the breaching manager from his position, which in turn might
trigger the automatic dissolution of the LLC); Haut v. Green Café Mgmt., Inc., 376 S.W.3d
171 (Tex. App. 2012). In Haut, the court ordered forfeiture of a membership, possibly
valued at $600,000, because of the many breaches of fiduciary duties to the LLC. Id. at
176–77. Peculiarly, the losing member in that case argued that he owed fiduciary duties
directly to only the members, and thus, the LLC had no standing to pursue breach-offiduciary-duty claims against him—an argument that the court rejected. Id. at 180; see also
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 4, § 9:10, at 516–19 (listing remedies available in
derivative LLC suits); cf. Risk Mgmt. Servs., L.L.C. v. Moss, 40 So. 3d 176, 179 (La. Ct.
App. 2010) (finding the former manager liable in a direct suit for breach of fiduciary duty
and awarding over $7.5 million in damages to the LLC).
270. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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